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Human Rights Abuses as Tort Harms: Losses in
Translation
Nathan J. Miller*
This Article provides the first-ever examination of the normative challenges
posed by bringing international human rights claims in state courts under the
common law of torts. It argues that the normative structure of the private law
of torts cannot adequately address the very different concerns at stake when
addressing public harms. Torts address issues that arise between two parties
and those parties alone. But public law addresses harms done simultaneously
to individuals and to the body politic. Redress for public harms should
encompass both individual and systemic remedies, but tort law offers only the
former. Instead of advancing tort claims, advocates should urge state courts to
exercise their concurrent jurisdiction over the customary international legal
norms incorporated into the federal common law to hear claims for violations of
international human rights.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Unless advocates make careful choices about where and under
what theories to file the next generation of human rights cases in the
United States, the impending shift from federal to state courts will rob
those cases of their public character and will reduce them to “garden
variety municipal torts.”1 Such an outcome will threaten the ability of
such litigation to catalyze the kind of systemic change necessary to
address human rights abuses.
Since 1980, U.S. courts have provided a forum, under the Alien
Tort Statute (ATS), sometimes referred to as the Alien Tort Claims Act
(ATCA), in which victims of human rights violations from all over the
world could seek redress (in the form of civil damages) for their abuses
against the individuals who perpetrated them.2 In the early years of
ATS litigation, the cases almost exclusively arose when foreign
plaintiffs sued foreign natural persons for conduct that occurred in a
foreign country.3 Starting in the mid-1990s more cases began to be
filed against multinational enterprises (MNEs) for their conduct
overseas.
For the better part of four decades, ATS cases have commanded
a significant share of the attention of scholars and advocates
concerned with enforcing human rights.4 This is in part because at the
time of its inception, ATS litigation was one of very few available
1

District Judge Woodlock first used that phrase in the ATS context in his opinion
in Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 183 (D. Mass. 1995) (“[R]eading [28 U.S.C.]
§ 1350 as essentially a jurisdictional grant only and then looking to domestic tort law
to provide the cause of action mutes the grave international law aspect of the tort,
reducing it to no more (or less) than a garden-variety municipal tort.”). See infra Part
III, for a fuller discussion of the ways in which classical tort law is unsuitable for
describing human rights violations.
2
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994).
3
These are frequently referred to as “foreign cubed” cases. The term “foreign
cubed” is generally credited to Stuart M. Grant and Diane Zilka. See generally Stuart M.
Grant & Diane Zilka, The Role of Foreign Investors in Federal Securities Class Actions, in
CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES (NUMBER B-1442) 91, 96
(Practising L. Inst. ed., 2004).
4
ATS litigation has generated over 227 law review articles (with ATS or ATCA in
the title alone) and 223 cases. Roger P. Alford, The Future of Human Rights Litigation
After Kiobel, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1749, 1751–52 (2014) (“The history of
international human rights litigation under the ATS is well known. Since Filártiga v.
Peña-Irala, such litigation has become something of a cottage industry, with over 150
cases filed alleging the commission of a tort in violation of the law of nations.”).
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enforcement mechanisms for the then-nascent body of international
human rights law. It is also in part because even as the international
human rights regime came into its own and more enforcement
mechanisms came into existence, their institutional architects by and
large adopted soft-law approaches more akin to diplomacy than to
adjudication.5 At the time the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
decided the first ATS case in 1980, human rights had barely begun its
transformation from political aspirations to legal standards. The
United Nations Human Rights Commission (“the Commission”) was
established by the Charter of the United Nations in 1946 but focused
on promulgating human rights texts and treaties rather than on
serving as an enforcement mechanism.6 The Commission produced
the first major international human rights treaties in 1966 but they did
not enter into force until 1976.7 The committees charged with
overseeing the implementation of those treaties adopted the model of
diplomatic dialogue common to other United Nations (UN)
committees rather than a more oppositional model based on
adjudication.8 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights was
established pursuant to the American Convention on Human Rights
in 1979, but the court did not issue its first judgment on the merits in
a contentious case until 1988.9 Other regional mechanisms, like the
African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights and the European
Court of Human Rights, are limited by resource constraints, state
5

Eric Posner captures the weakness of international human rights enforcement
mechanisms. ERIC POSNER, THE TWILIGHT OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 39–52 (2014).
Posner is generally skeptical of the value and efficacy of international human rights
discourse, but many of the same points are made by ardent supporters. See, e.g.,
GEOFFREY ROBERTSON, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: THE STRUGGLE FOR GLOBAL JUSTICE
(3d ed. 2007).
6
Brief Historic Overview of the Commission on Human Rights, UNITED NATIONS HUM.
RTS. OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/
CHR/BriefHistoric.doc (“For the first 20 years (1947-1966), the Commission
concentrated its efforts on standard-setting.”).
7
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), G.A. Res. 2200
(XXI) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200(XXI) (Dec. 16, 1966), http://www.ohchr.org/en/
professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx; International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200(XXI)
(Dec. 16, 1966), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/
CESCR.aspx.
8
The committees exercise the latter function only when expressly authorized to
do so by countries that ratify a separate treaty. See, e.g., Optional Protocol to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) A, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/2200(XXI) (Dec. 16, 1966), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/
ProfessionalInterest/Pages/OPCCPR1.aspx.
9
Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4 (July 29, 1988).
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intransigence, and limited powers. None of the bodies at the
international or regional levels involve claims against individuals, only
against states.
ATS litigation, on the other hand, has provided international law
with a much-needed and much sought-after path to liability for
individuals (whether natural or corporate).10 This litigation has
offered victims of human rights abuses, war crimes, and crimes against
humanity a chance to face their abusers directly and to have a court of
law adjudicate their cases.
Judges who deliberated on the
interpretation of international human rights law became connected to
their counterparts in the global legal conversation that shapes the
world’s increasingly shared understanding of transnational legal
norms.
Judges in ATS cases have interpreted and applied
international law regarding, among other things, torture,11
extrajudicial execution,12 disappearance,13 arbitrary detention,14
incitement to genocide,15 and human trafficking.16 Importantly, the
ATS also offered one of the few ways to hold MNEs accountable for
their complicity in human rights abuses.17 Although damage awards in
10

See infra notes 17–18 and accompanying text.
See Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (finding that torture
violates the law of nations and that the ATS gives federal courts subject matter
jurisdiction over such claims).
12
See Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162 (D. Mass. 1995) (awarding over fortyseven million dollars to plaintiffs who suffered human rights violations, including
extrajudicial execution, due to the actions of the Guatemalan Defense Minister).
13
See Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 694 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (awarding plaintiff
four million dollars in total damages on claims of torture, prolonged arbitrary
detention, and disappearances); see also Reyes v. Grijalba, No. 02-22046-civlenard/klein (S.D. Fla. Mar. 31, 2006) (awarding plaintiffs forty seven million dollars
for torture and disappearances in Honduras), http://www.ccrjustice.org/sites/
default/files/assets/files/Reyes%20v%20Grijalba%20%20final%20judgment%20Ma
r%202006.pdf.
14
See Kpadeh v. Emmanuel, 261 F.R.D. 687 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (awarding plaintiffs
over twenty-two million dollars for Charles “Chuckie” Taylor’s human rights violations
in Liberia, including arbitrary detention).
15
See Mushikiwabo v. Barayagwiza, No. 94-cv-3627, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4409
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 1996) (awarding plaintiffs about $105 million on claims of incitement
to genocide during the Rwandan genocide).
16
See United States v. Bianchi, 386 F. App’x 156 (3d Cir. 2010) (ordering
defendant to settle with trafficked minors for $725,000 for engaging in child sex
trafficking); Aguilar v. Imperial Nurseries, No. 3-07-cv-193, 2008 WL 2572250 (D.
Conn. May 28, 2008) (entering judgment against defendants who forced twelve
trafficked Guatemalan plaintiffs in Connecticut to work for little pay at a tree nursery).
17
The power of MNEs, in many cases, rivals or exceeds the power of many states.
MNEs have the ability to inflict harms on the same scale and of the same character as
states’ violations of human rights norms. Thus, although MNEs are not states and
11
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ATS cases were rarely collected, judgments in favor of plaintiffs
contributed to the doctrinal and normative development of
international law and provided ammunition for advocacy against
offending governments or MNEs.18
But in the 2013 case of Kiobel vs. Royal Dutch Petroleum, the
Supreme Court closed the door on most, if not all, claims under the
ATS in U.S. courts.19 In Kiobel, twelve Nigerian plaintiffs sued on behalf
of their relatives who had been detained, tortured, given show trials,
and executed by the Nigerian military in retaliation for peacefully
protesting aggressive oil exploitation in their homeland. The plaintiffs
contended that Royal Dutch Petroleum’s local subsidiary, Shell
Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria, provided funds, food,
and a base of operations to the soldiers and therefore was complicit in
the soldiers’ violations of international law.20 Ultimately at issue in
Kiobel was whether the ATS gave the courts jurisdiction over acts that
occurred outside of U.S. territory.21
The Court unanimously
therefore do not have obligations under international human rights law, scholars,
advocates, and major institutional players have been searching for both theoretical
and practical ways to hold MNEs accountable for human rights violations. See, e.g.,
LARA JILL BLECHER ET AL., CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IMPACTS: NEW
EXPECTATIONS AND PARADIGMS (2015); NICOLA M. C. P. JÄGERS, CORPORATE HUMAN
RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS: IN SEARCH OF ACCOUNTABILITY (2002).
18
See generally Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE
L.J. 2347 (1991). In this seminal article, Koh identifies ATS cases and other similar
actions as part of an emerging trend he dubs transnational public law litigation (TPL).
TPL is generally understood to involve states, government officials, and private
individuals suing one another, and being sued in turn, in cases that require the
simultaneous application of domestic law and international law (both treaty-based and
customary). ATS cases are not the only example of TPL. Other examples include: In
re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal India in December, 1984, 809
F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987) and Philippines v. Marcos, 653 F. Supp. 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
These, however, are the minority when compared to the volume of ATS litigation.
Since Filártiga, there have been about 173 judicial opinions regarding the ATS.
Donald R. Childress III, The Alien Tort Statute, Federalism, and the Next Wave of
Transnational Litigation, 100 GEO. L.J. 709, 713 (2012); see also Julian G. Ku, The Curious
Case of Corporate Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute: A Flawed System of Judicial
Lawmaking, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 353, 357 (2011).
19
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
20
Id. at 1663.
21
This was not the original issue on which the Court granted certiorari. Plaintiffs
appealed the Second Circuit Court of Appeals’ finding that the ATS did not cover acts
undertaken by corporations but only natural persons. Petition for Writ of Certiorari
at 10, Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (No. 10-1491), 2011 WL 2326721, at *10 (arguing that the
decision “asserts a radical overhaul of all existing ATS jurisprudence . . . by creating a
blanket immunity for corporations engaged or complicit in universally condemned
human rights violations”). After oral arguments on that question, the Court took the
unusual step of ordering re-argument on the question of whether the presumption of
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concluded that it did not, reviving a presumption against the
extraterritorial application of the laws of the United States.22 Finding
no evidence of Congressional intent to extend the ATS to conduct in
foreign countries, the Court ruled that the presumption applied, that
plaintiffs did not have a cause of action under the ATS.23 Furthermore,
the court held that “even where the claims touch and concern the
territory of the United States, they must do so with sufficient force to
displace the presumption against extraterritorial application.”24
Although the criteria announced by the Court could, in theory,
be satisfied fairly easily, lower courts applying Kiobel have held plaintiffs
seeking to overcome the presumption on extraterritoriality to an
extremely high standard.25 Plaintiffs in Balintulo v. Daimler AG,26 the
long-running apartheid case, argued in the Second Circuit that their
claim met Kiobel’s “touch and concern” standard because the
defendants, corporations that had allegedly assisted South Africa in the
maintenance of the apartheid regime, were U.S. nationals.27 The
Second Circuit was unconvinced.28 The plaintiffs’ assertion that their
claims arose in part from actions taken inside the United States by the
defendants did not sway the court.29 Other courts have taken a
similarly stringent view of the requirements of the “touch and concern”
standard.30
extraterritoriality applied to the ATS. Brief of Amici Curiae Washington Legal
Foundation and Allied Educational Foundation in Support of Respondents on
Reargument at 3, Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (No. 10-1491), 2012 WL 3245484, at *3.
22
Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669 (“[T]he presumption against extraterritoriality applies
to claims under the ATS, and . . . nothing in the statute rebuts that presumption.”).
23
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 140 (2d Cir. 2010) aff’d, 133
S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (“It bears underscoring that the purpose of the ATS was not to
encourage United States courts to create new norms of customary international law
unilaterally.”).
24
Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669.
25
Marco Basile, Nine Months Later: Kiobel in the Courts, AJIL UNBOUND (Jan. 28,
2014, 3:59 PM), http://www.asil.org/blogs/nine-months-later-kiobel-lower-courts.
26
727 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 2013).
27
Id. at 189; see also Basile, supra note 25.
28
Balintulo, 727 F.3d at 191 (explaining that “[p]laintiffs’ . . . case-specific policy
arguments miss the mark”).
29
Id. at 192 (holding that the defendants could not be held vicariously liable for
their conduct under the ATS because their agents “did not commit relevant conduct
within the United States giving rise to a violation of customary international law—that
is, because the asserted ‘violation[s] of the law of nations occur[ed] outside the United
States’”) (citing Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013)).
30
Basile, supra note 25 (“Balintulo . . . is representative of lower courts’
approach . . . . [O]ther federal courts have ruled that it is insufficient that a defendant
corporation is a U.S. national (Adhikari), made some decisions in the United States
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The upshot of the Kiobel decision and the few cases applying it
thus far is that the Court has closed the doors of federal courts to most
international human rights cases. That is not to say that all human
rights claims arising overseas are forever barred. A few avenues
remain. Advocates will no doubt continue to take advantage of the
Torture Victims Protection Act (TVPA)31 and the Violence Against
Women Act (VAWA)32—both providing a statutory basis for victims of
harms suffered overseas to bring claims in U.S. courts. Another
potential route is to take action against individual corporate officers
for actions in the United States.33 But the TVPA, the VAWA, and the
speculative possibility of suing corporate officers collectively cover only
a small fraction of the claims previously available under the ATS, which
included any claim arising under the “law of nations” as the term was
defined by the Supreme Court.34
By barring all or most ATS cases in federal courts, the Supreme
Court has cleared the conceptual space previously occupied by
advocacy under and analysis of the ATS.35 Scholars and advocates have
begun to explore that newly vacated space, advancing several creative
approaches to holding human rights abusers—especially MNEs—
regarding the conduct (Giraldo), or had ‘substantial operations in this country,’
including billions of dollars of assets (Rio Tinto). Other courts have held that it’s
insufficient that a defendant had taken refuge in the United States to avoid
prosecution (Dacer) or that a defendant ‘specifically directed’ an online propaganda
campaign at persons living in the United States (Chen Gang).”).
31
The TVPA allows a torture victim to initiate civil suits in the United States
against the perpetrator for damages. See Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub.
L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994)),
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c102:H.R.2092.ENR [hereinafter TVPA].
32
The VAWA, for example, mandates that victims cannot be forced to pay for a
rape exam, ensuring that the victim’s protection order is enforced and increasing the
rate of prosecution against perpetrators. For a full list, see Factsheet: The Violence Against
Women Act, THE WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/
docs/vawa_factsheet.pdf.
33
See JENNIFER ZERK, CORPORATE LIABILITY FOR GROSS HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES
(2015), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/DomesticLaw
Remedies/StudyDomesticeLawRemedies.pdf (discussing the issue and possible
solutions); see also Corporations Must be Held Accountable for Human Rights Violations,
UNITED NATIONS HUM. RTS. OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R (Feb. 20, 2012),
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/CorporationsMustBeHeldAccountab
leForHRViolations.aspx.
34
See infra notes 92–98 and accompanying text.
35
See supra note 4 and accompanying text. It is important to note that the decline
in the fortunes of the ATS was by no means wholly caused by the Court’s decision in
Kiobel. See also Susan Simpson, Alien Tort Statute Cases Resulting in Plaintiff Victories, THE
VIEW FROM LL2 (Nov. 11, 2009), http://viewfromll2.com/2009/11/11/alien-tortstatute-cases-resulting-in-plaintiff-victories/.
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accountable. One such approach rests on the contention that the
interests of both multinational corporations and the individuals
potentially harmed by those corporations’ activities would be well
served by an International Court of Civil Justice (ICCJ) empowered to
hear claims for damages brought by individuals.36 An ICCJ would
obviate the need to reform national legal systems in ways that might be
difficult and complicated.37 Other commentators argue directly for
undertaking the difficult and complicated task of reforming national
legal systems to close off the escape routes currently available to
MNEs.38 Still others argue that international human rights law needs
to be amended to provide explicitly for individual and corporate
liability for human rights abuses.39
Some commentators have suggested focusing on the political
branches of state government.40 Governors, for instance, have been
very active in international affairs in ways that, while profound, seem
not to have spurred concerns about encroachment on the foreign
relations power of the federal executive.41 Governors respond to the
demands made by foreign governments and international institutions,
enter into international agreements, and impose, often at their
discretion, sanctions authorized by the state legislature.42 Surely where
such an exercise of state executive power on the international stage is
unremarkable, governors could be urged to act by, for example,
importing international human rights standards into state
administrative regulations.

36

Maya Steinitz, The Case for an International Court of Civil Justice, 67 STAN. L. REV.
ONLINE 75 (2014); Maya Steinitz & Paul Gowder, Transnational Litigation as Prisoner’s
Dilemma, N.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016).
37
See Steinitz, supra note 36 (discussing the “problem of the missing forum” where
U.S. courts will send a case back to the courts of the country where the injury occurred
on a forum non conveniens motion, then refuse to enforce the judgment produced by
those same courts on the grounds of corruption in the judicial system).
38
Janet Dine, Jurisdictional Arbitrage by Multinational Companies: A National Law
Solution?, 3 J. HUM. RTS. & ENV’T. 44 (2012).
39
HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY: ISSUES AND ACTION (4th ed. 2016)
(unpublished manuscript).
40
Zachary D. Clopton, State Law Litigation of International Norms: Horizontal and
Vertical Dimensions, 108 AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L L. PROC., 2014, at 433–36.
41
Julian G. Ku, Gubernatorial Foreign Policy, 115 YALE L.J. 2380, 2391–92 (2006)
(“[G]overnors can also take a more direct and assertive role in foreign policy by
negotiating and entering into international agreements . . . . These agreements seek
to regulate a variety of international matters such as fuel tax allocation, crossborder
motor vehicle regulation, natural resources management, and even greenhouse gas
emissions.”).
42
Id. at 2385.

MILLER (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES AS TORT HARMS

2/1/2016 5:36 PM

513

Similarly, at least one commentator has noted that state
legislatures could be urged to pass some version of a state ATS
explicitly authorizing ATS-style claims in state courts.43 Such a statute
would give the legislature(s) involved the chance to dispel much of the
ambiguity created by the sparse language of the ATS by, for instance,
specifying the international law claims being authorized.44
Many scholars and advocates, however, are not ready to give up
on the possibility of bringing human rights claims in U.S. courts under
existing law. In exploring ways to preserve the advantages of ATS
litigation mentioned above, these stalwarts are therefore turning their
attention to state courts as the next vanguard of human rights litigation
in the United States.45 The move to state courts offers several
advantages. First and foremost, it would not require marshaling
international consensus, the way an ICCJ would, or engaging in
extensive domestic legal reform, the way establishing enterprise
liability in dozens of successive countries would. Furthermore,
assuming that plaintiffs are fortunate enough to establish personal
jurisdiction, state courts are the only place where individual agents of
the state might be called to account for human rights violations that
fall short of war crimes or crimes against humanity.
The most important advantage of state courts might be their
freedom from the constitutional limitations imposed on the
jurisdiction of federal courts. As courts of general jurisdiction, state
courts would be able to entertain ATS-like claims as torts without an
enabling statute. After all, “[a]lmost every international law violation
is also an intentional tort. Torture is assault and battery. Terrorism is
wrongful death. Slavery is false imprisonment.”46 That would, in
43

See generally Clopton, supra note 40.
See generally Ernest A. Young, Universal Jurisdiction, the Alien Tort Statute, and
Transnational Public-Law Litigation After Kiobel, 64 DUKE L.J. 1023 (2015) (discussing
the need for such a statute on the federal level and the elements that might be
included). See also Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 177 YALE
L.J. 408 (2007); Ernest A. Young, Toward a Framework Statute for Supranational
Adjudication, 57 EMORY L.J. 93 (2007).
45
See Alford, supra note 4; Childress III, supra note 18, at 743. The Irvine Law
Review also recently published a symposium issue on human rights litigation in state
courts. See generally Christopher A. Whytock, Donald Earl Childress III & Michael D.
Ramsey, After Kiobel: International Human Rights Litigation in State Courts and Under State
Law, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1 (2013); see also Patrick J. Borchers, Conflict of Laws
Considerations in State Court Human Rights Actions, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 45 (2013); Paul
Hoffman & Beth Stephens, International Human Rights Cases Under State Law and in State
Courts, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 9 (2013); Chimène I. Keitener, State Torts and Transitory
Torts in Transnational and Human Rights Cases, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 81 (2013).
46
Alford, supra note 4, at 1750.
44
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theory, free state courts from the straightjacket imposed on federal
courts by the Supreme Court’s ruling in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.47 It
could also make it easier for plaintiffs to prove their cases since the
elements of assault, for instance, are considerably easier to show than
the elements of torture.48 In addition, nearly every legal system
provides some kind of remedy for tort harms, reducing the danger that
choice-of-law analyses favoring the law of the place of injury would
deprive plaintiffs of a cause of action.49
But state courts are hardly a panacea. Potential plaintiffs will face
obstacles such as obtaining personal jurisdiction,50 surviving forum non
conveniens motions,51 overcoming common law doctrines of immunity,
and conforming to the requirements of due process52—not to mention
the logistical difficulties of locating evidence and witnesses overseas
and producing them in the United States. Perhaps the disparity
between the apparent ease of translating human rights abuses into tort
harms and the difficulty of finding a way through the barriers to
accessing state courts explains why scholars have, to date, focused
almost exclusively on the latter issue.
This Article instead focuses on what happens if those barriers are
overcome, showing that translating human rights abuses into tort
harms sacrifices normativity at the altar of practicality, and in so doing
undermines many of the aims that have animated the last thirty years
of human rights litigation in federal courts. In so doing, this Article
assumes, for the sake of argument, that committed and formidable
advocates will in some cases manage to overcome the obstacles to
access and will succeed in bringing international human rights cases,
47

Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004) (“Whatever the ultimate
criteria for accepting a cause of action subject to jurisdiction under § 1350, we are
persuaded that federal courts should not recognize private claims under federal
common law for violations of any international law norm with less definite content and
acceptance among civilized nations than the historical paradigms familiar when § 1350
was enacted.”). To take but one example, international human rights law requires that
individuals, who are arrested and imprisoned, have their case assessed by a judge
“promptly.” ICCPR, supra note 7, art. 9. While someone who was administratively
detained (i.e. imprisoned without warrant, probable cause, or other legal authority)
or arrested and jailed for an extended period of time might have a claim of false
imprisonment, the prohibition on extended, unreviewed detention would probably
not rise to the level of the law of nations as defined by the Supreme Court in Sosa.
48
Whytock et al., supra note 45, at 6.
49
David Kaye, State Execution of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 95, 101 (2013).
50
Borchers, supra note 45, at 49.
51
Id.
52
Id. at 58; Hoffman & Stephens, supra note 45, at 9 n.57 and accompanying text.
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appropriately translated into torts, into state courts. It then asks the
question: What would success look like? Human rights law is a body
of public law that ultimately aims to delineate the appropriate
boundaries of the relationship between the governing and the
governed. ATS cases, although taking the typically private-law form of
individual claims for damages, largely preserved that public character.
Indeed, both advocates and courts went to great lengths to argue for
public international law, and not municipal tort law, private law, to be
the law of decision in ATS cases. If the public character of ATS cases
is worth preserving, the success or failure of that preservation adds
another dimension to questions about the future after Kiobel and about
the viability of translating human rights abuses into torts.
This Article will tease out the tension inherent in the public/
private dichotomy by showing, in Part II, that courts repeatedly evinced
a strong preference for public international law over private tort law.
In so doing, the courts added a “public international tort” to the two
“constitutional torts” recognized by the Supreme Court in Monroe v.
Pape53 and in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics.54 These “public torts” are carefully constructed hybrids of
public and private law. Part III will argue that fully translating human
rights harms into tort claims upends that careful construction by
showing, first, that the notion of equality underlying tort law is
incompatible with the very different notion of equality at stake in
addressing public harms and, second, that the remedies adequate for
addressing violations of the public and private law are different in kind.
Finally, Part IV will propose a novel approach that would preserve the
advantages of turning to state courts after Kiobel without sacrificing the
normative value of describing public harms using the public law.
Advocates should bring cases in state courts under the federal common
law of customary international law, which state courts are compelled
to apply under the presumption of concurrent jurisdiction.

53

Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled on other grounds by Monell v. Dep’t
of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Monell “overrules” Monroe only to
the extent that it removes immunity from § 1983 claims for municipalities.
54
403 U.S. 388 (1971).
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II. THE PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL TORT
Time and again, starting with Filártiga v. Peña-Irala55 in 1980 and
continuing through the foundational first fifteen years of
jurisprudence, courts were called on to decide—among many other
challenging legal questions—whether the rule of decision in ATS cases
was international law or municipal torts. Time and again, starting with
Filártiga, the courts decided on international law. In so doing, they
replicated the model of the constitutional tort developed in the two
decades preceding the revival of the ATS.
A. Hostis Humani Generis
ATS cases did not have to be international human rights cases.
They became such as the result of the conscious choices of advocates
and judges, which included explicitly rejecting domestic tort law as
inadequate to capture the magnitude of human rights abuses and
favoring public international law as the rule of decision in ATS cases.56
In 1980, the case of Filártiga57 revolutionized human rights
advocacy by giving victims of human rights abuses a forum in the
federal courts of the United States where they could bring cases against
their foreign oppressors for acts that took place on foreign soil.58 The
ATS, originally passed by Congress as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789,
later became codified in its modern form in § 1350 of the U.S. Code
as Alien’s action for tort.59 The text of the statute is only thirty-three words
long. It reads in full: “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction
of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of
the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”60 In the nearly two
55

630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
See William S. Dodge, Alien Tort Litigation: Road Not Taken, 89 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1577 (2014), for a thorough and incisive history of those decisions and their
implications.
57
630 F.2d at 876 (finding that torture violated the law of nations as defined in
the ATS, and thus set the precedent for U.S. federal courts to have jurisdiction over
cases concerning torts committed abroad that violated international law); see also BETH
STEPHENS ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN U.S. COURTS xxii (2d ed.
2008) (noting that Filártiga was “the first successful use of the [ATS] to enable victims
of international human rights violations to sue in U.S. courts”).
58
Such fact patterns have come to be called “foreign cubed” or “f-cubed” by ATS
practitioners. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 172 (2d Cir. 2008)
(“This is the first so-called ‘foreign-cubed’ securities class action to reach this Circuit.”)
(citing Grant et al., supra note 3, at 96 (coining the term “foreign-cubed”)), aff’d, 561
U.S. 247 (2010).
59
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012). See also, Beth Stephens, The Curious History of the Alien
Tort Statute, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1467, 1470 (2014).
60
§ 1350.
56
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hundred years that the statute was on the books prior to Filártiga, it was
applied only a handful of times,61 and none of those cases dealt with
the newly invented body of international human rights law.62
At the outset of the modern era of ATS litigation, it was therefore
unclear whether such claims would survive an objection to jurisdiction,
much less what the rule of decision would be should a court reach the
merits. The Filártiga case came about when Dr. Joel Filártiga and his
daughter Dolly, who were living in the United States, learned that
Americo Norberto Peña-Irala (“Peña”) was living in New York City.63
Peña, a former Inspector General in the Paraguyan police force, had
tortured Joelito (son to Joel and brother to Dolly) to death in
retaliation for his father’s political views.64 In a landmark decision, the
Second Circuit found that the ATS did grant jurisdiction over claims
such as the Filártigas’, provided that the allegations made in the
complaint in fact constituted a violation of international law.65
Although the primary issue in Filártiga was jurisdiction,66 the
arguments of the parties, the decision of the Second Circuit, and the
decision of the district court on remand, framed much of the
subsequent debate about the proper rule of decision. In the district
court, in support of their argument that the claim satisfied the
jurisdictional requirements of the ATS, the Filártigas submitted
affidavits from titans of international law confirming that the
prohibition of torture had coalesced into a norm of customary
international law.67
The defense did not contest plaintiffs’
61

See Simpson, supra note 35.
When Filártiga was first filed in 1979, human rights law was barely ten years old.
Although the Charter of the United Nations mentions human rights, and the United
Nations (UN) General Assembly passed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in
1948, the first legal instruments containing human rights obligations were opened for
signature in 1967 and entered into force in 1976. See ICCPR, supra note 7; ICESCR,
supra note 7.
63
Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 87879 (2d Cir. 1980).
64
Id. at 878.
65
Id. at 88788.
66
Id. at 887 (“[W]e reverse the judgment of the district court dismissing the
complaint for want of federal jurisdiction.”).
67
The plaintiffs had to rely on customary international law, or the law of nations.
The other prong of the ATS, the treaties of the United States, was unavailable to them
since the United States had yet to ratify a treaty that prohibited torture. It has since
ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading Treatment or
Punishment. See WILLIAM J. ACEVES, THE ANATOMY OF TORTURE: A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF FILÁRTIGA V. PEÑA IRALA 334 (2007) (“By virtue of, inter alia, article 5 of the
Universal Declaration [of Human Rights] and Article 7 of the Covenant [on Civil and
Political Rights], torture is an offense against the Law of Nations . . . . While the real
62
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characterization of international law at either the trial or appellate
level.68 Rather, the defendants argued that the constitutional limits on
the causes of action over which Congress could grant federal
jurisdiction—through § 1350 or any statute—were limited (at most) to
a small subset of international law encompassed by the operation in
U.S. jurisprudence of the term of art “the law of nations.”69 The
defense went further and implicitly ceded the question of whether
torture was a violation of customary international law. The defense
argued that the court should ignore the many treaties and other
international declarations cited by the plaintiffs, not because the
plaintiffs misconstrued the current state of international law, but
because customary international law on its own was incapable of
creating enforceable obligations in U.S. courts outside a narrow band
of breaches of the law of nations.70 The defense relied in part on
language from the Second Circuit’s opinion in Dreyfus v. Von Fink
suggesting that the international law could not reach the question of a
state’s treatment of its own citizens.71 In other words, rather than
contest the claim that customary international law prohibited torture,
the defense argued that the prohibition did not matter because the law
of nations in the United States was restricted to state-state disputes.72
Thus when the Second Circuit interpreted the scope of § 1350 as
encompassing international law generally (as opposed to the
constrained version argued for by the defense), the plaintiffs’ version
of that general international law stood unopposed.
Although deciding only the question of jurisdiction, the Second
Circuit expressed its holding in such strong language that its opinion
exerted significant influence on the next decade-and-a-half of debate
over the applicable law. This debate was conducted, at least in part,
over the effect of the choice of law on the ability of U.S. courts to live
party in interest in these offenses against human rights is the individual, it has long
been recognized that such offenses vitally affect relations between states.”) (affidavit
of Myres S. MacDougal, Professor of Law at Yale Law School).
68
Id. at 298.
69
Id. at 302 (“Where in this grant is the authority of Congress to confer upon the
United States District Courts jurisdiction over ‘any civil action by an alien for a tort
only, committed in violation of the law of nations?’”).
70
Id. at 305–06 (“Indeed, that statute [§ 1350] could not be construed to confer
jurisdiction over a case such as this, because, if it were, it would be beyond the authority
granted to Congress by Article III of the Federal Constitution.”).
71
Id. at 305 (citing Dreyfus v. von Finck, 534 F.2d 24, 30–31 (2d Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 835 (1976)).
72
Id. at 302 (explaining that cases “have restricted the phrase ‘law of nations’ to
relations between states rather than among individuals”).
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up to their obligation to enforce the collective will of the community
of nations. The court held, for instance, relying in part on the
plaintiffs’ uncontested expert opinions,73 that:
In light of the universal condemnation of torture in
numerous international agreements, and the renunciation
of torture as an instrument of official policy by virtually all of
the nations of the world (in principle if not in practice), we
find that an act of torture committed by a state official against
one held in detention violates established norms of the
international law of human rights, and hence the law of
nations.74
The Second Circuit dismissed the notion from Dreyfus relied on
by Filártiga—that international law encompassed only obligations of
states vis-à-vis other states—as “clearly out of tune with the current
usage and practice of international law.”75 Finally, the Second Circuit
concluded with a now-famous passage that painted the ability of
torture victims to pursue civil liability against their torturers as an
important part of modernity’s quest to perfect the relationship of a
state to its citizens. Because of its influence on the conceptualization
of ATS cases as human rights (as opposed to tort) claims, the passage
is worth quoting in full:
In the twentieth century the international community has
come to recognize the common danger posed by the flagrant
disregard of basic human rights and particularly the right to
be free of torture. Spurred first by the Great War, and then
the Second, civilized nations have banded together to
prescribe acceptable norms of international behavior. From
the ashes of the Second World War arose the United Nations
Organization, amid hopes that an era of peace and
cooperation had at last begun. Though many of these
aspirations have remained elusive goals, that circumstance
cannot diminish the true progress that has been made. In
the modern age, humanitarian and practical considerations
have combined to lead the nations of the world to recognize
that respect for fundamental human rights is in their
73

ACEVES, supra note 67, at 584 (“The Filártigas submitted the affidavits of a
number of distinguished international legal scholars, who stated unanimously that the
law of nations prohibits absolutely the use of torture as alleged in the complaint.”).
The court went on to quote the experts extensively in a footnote. See id. at 584 n.4.
74
Id. at 585–86.
75
Id. at 745 (citing Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884 (2d Cir. 1980))
(providing a copy of the court opinion in Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860
(E.D.N.Y. 1984)).

MILLER (DO NOT DELETE)

520

2/1/2016 5:36 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:361

individual and collective interest.
Among the rights
universally proclaimed by all nations, as we have noted, is the
right to be free of physical torture. Indeed, for purposes of
civil liability, the torturer has become like the pirate and slave
trader before him hostis humani generis, an enemy of all
mankind. Our holding today, giving effect to a jurisdictional
provision enacted by our First Congress, is a small but
important step in the fulfillment of the ageless dream to free
all people from brutal violence.76
Although the Second Circuit did not decide the issue of the law
to be applied to the case’s merits—and even suggested that the law of
the place of injury, Paraguay, might apply,77—the court clearly signaled
its understanding that the ATS served functions distinctly in the realm
of public law: states’ peaceful foreign relations and the rights-based
restraints on those states’ treatment of the people in their territory. It
is important to emphasize that this language suggested not only that
international law might be an appropriate rule of decision, but that
courts might even be obliged by the weight and significance of the rights
at stake to choose international law.
In the trial on remand, the plaintiffs built on the expansive
opinion of the Second Circuit to argue that the law of Paraguay
inadequately captured the nature of torture. They argued that the
problem of torture is by definition international and that it is
universally condemned: “Thus, present in this case is the compelling
interest of the community of nations as well as this nation in the
condemnation of torture. It is not a simple crime but a crime which
transcends the balance of civilization itself.”78 The transcendent nature
of torture meant that it should not be reduced to national law.79 The
district court agreed, deciding the question of whether “the ‘tort’ to
which the statute refers mean a wrong ‘in violation of the law of
76

Filártiga, 630 F.2d at 890.
The court discussed the doctrine of transitory tort at length, where a tortfeasor
may be sued in U.S. courts for a tort committed abroad, and where courts would
normally apply the law of the place of injury. In that context, the court noted, in
passing, that the law of Paraguay may be applied to the merits. ACEVES, supra note 67,
at 593–94.
78
Id. at 673.
79
Id. at 680–81 (“Thus only a remedy tailored to effectuate the purposes of the
international guarantees of human rights is consistent with the concurrence of the
nations that torture is absolutely forbidden and that its practices violates international
law. In such a setting, it is clear that the needs of the international community can be
met not by mere application of the law of one or another nation state having an
interest in the matter, but by an application of the law directed by international
principles and practice itself.”).
77
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nations’ or merely a wrong actionable under the law of the appropriate
sovereign state”80 firmly in favor of international law, even quoting
favorably the Second Circuit’s language about the torturer as hostis
humani generis and noting that “[w]e are dealing not with an ordinary
case of assault and battery.”81
The continued influence of the Filártiga formulation shows up in
the important concurring opinion by Judge Edwards of the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic.82 The
plaintiffs in Tel-Oren were the family members and survivors of the 1978
attack by members of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) on
civilians in Israel.83 The militants from the PLO pulled vehicles off a
road, held the passengers captive, and tortured some and killed others,
before Israeli police finally stopped them.84 The district court
dismissed the case, and the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the
dismissal.85 In his concurring opinion, Judge Edwards noted that he
agreed with the dismissal because the PLO, as a non-state entity, could
not have the same obligations under international law as states.86 He
felt compelled, however, to write a concurring opinion setting out his
conclusion that the ATS would provide a cause of action given different
facts, in contrast to Judge Bork who believed it would not.87 Judge
80

Id. at 74. William J. Aceves also noted:
In order to take the international condemnation of torture
seriously this court must adopt a remedy appropriate to the ends
and reflective of the nature of the condemnation. Torture is
viewed with universal abhorrence; the prohibition of torture by
international consensus and express international accords is clear
and unambiguous; and, “for purposes of civil liability, the torturer
has become—like the pirate and the slave trader before him—
hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind.” We are dealing
not with an ordinary case of assault and battery. If the courts of
the United States are to adhere to the consensus of the
community of humankind, any remedy they fashion must
recognize that this case concerns an act so monstrous as to make
the perpetrator an outlaw around the globe.
Id. at 748 (emphasis added) (citing Filártiga, 630 F.2d at 884, 888, 890).
81
Id. at 748.
82
726 F.2d 774, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring).
83
Id. at 774.
84
Id. at 775–77.
85
Id. at 775 (majority opinion) (per curiam); see also Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab
Republic, 517 F. Supp. 542, 551 (D.D.C. 1981).
86
Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 791 (Edwards, J., concurring).
87
Id. at 775 (“I write separately to underscore the rationale for my decision; I do
this because, as will be apparent, there are sharp differences of viewpoint among the
judges who have grappled with these cases over the meaning and application of 28
U.S.C. § 1350 (1976).”).
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Edwards ultimately agreed with the Filártiga approach, quoting (yet
again) its characterization of the torturer (along with pirates and slave
traders) as hostis humani generis88 in support of the conclusion that
international law from time to time produces norms of such strength
and subject to such common consensus that they would give rise to civil
liability.89 Although conceding that he preferred to apply international
law to ATS cases, Judge Edwards acknowledged that doing so would
saddle federal judges with the immense burden of deriving specific
standards of liability from an amorphous body of law.90 He therefore
offered an alternative formulation, under which the ATS would be
merely the jurisdictional hook, and judges would apply tort law to the
merits.91
The district court in Xuncax v. Gramajo92 closely compared the
international law and municipal law approaches outlined by Judge
Edwards in Tel-Oren, the latter of which had also been applied by the
Ninth Circuit only a year earlier.93 The plaintiffs in Xuncax were
indigenous persons from Guatemala who had either been tortured by
Guatemalan security forces or whose family members were tortured—
sometimes to death—by those same forces.94 They sued Hector
Gramajo, the former Minister of Defense and, before that, commander
of the military division with authority over their home region.95 In
rejecting the application of domestic law in favor of international law,
88

Id. at 781 (“The reference to piracy and slave-trading is not fortuitous.
Historically these offenses held a special place in the law of nations: their perpetrators,
dubbed enemies of all mankind, were susceptible to prosecution by any nation
capturing them.”).
89
Id. (“The inference is that persons may be susceptible to civil liability if they
commit either a crime traditionally warranting universal jurisdiction or an offense that
comparably violates current norms of international law.”). Judge Edwards went
further, identifying candidates for inclusion in the law of nations, understood in this
context to consist of norms of sufficient strength and universality. These included “(a)
genocide; (b) slavery or slave trade; (c) the murder or causing the disappearance of
individuals; (d) torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment; (e) prolonged arbitrary detention; (f) systematic racial discrimination;
(g) consistent patterns of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.”
Id.
90
Id. (stating that “[w]hile [the Filártiga formulation] approach is consistent with
the language of section 1350, it places an awesome duty on federal district courts to
derive from an amorphous entity—i.e., the ‘law of nations’—standards of liability
applicable in concrete situations”).
91
Id. at 782.
92
886 F. Supp. 162 (D. Mass. 1995).
93
See In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467, 1476 n.10 (9th Cir. 1994).
94
Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 169 (D. Mass. 1995).
95
Id. at 171.
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the court weighed several factors, including fidelity to the plain
language of the statute, the amount of flexibility a solution under
international law would afford the courts, and the ability of the federal
judiciary to shoulder the interpretive burden described by Judge
Edwards.96 In a passage especially important in the present context,
the court discussed the difference between applying tort law and
international law:
[L]ooking to domestic tort law to provide the cause of action
mutes the grave international law aspect of the tort, reducing
it to no more (or less) than a garden-variety municipal tort.
This is not merely a question of formalism or even of the
amount or type of damages available; rather it concerns the
proper characterization of the kind of wrongs meant to be
addressed under § 1350: those perpetrated by hostis humani
generis (“enemies of all humankind”) in contravention of jus
cogens (peremptory norms of international law). In this light,
municipal tort law is an inadequate placeholder for such
values.97
The Filártiga formulation became so cemented, and the
application of international law so well-accepted by courts, that by the
time the Supreme Court finally considered the ATS, the question of
using it as a grant of jurisdiction and relying on tort law as the rule of
decision did not even come up. In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the Court
decided that while the ATS was purely jurisdictional and did not itself
create a cause of action, at least some wrongs under international law
entered the common law and would provide the cause of action to go
along with the jurisdictional grant of the ATS.98 Urging judicial
restraint in making new common law, the Court held “that federal
courts should not recognize private claims under federal common law
for violations of any international law norm with less definite content
and acceptance among civilized nations than the historical paradigms
familiar when § 1350 was enacted.”99 Although the Court did not
specify which norms would make the cut, it suggested that the
standards articulated by earlier courts, such as hostis humani generis,

96

Id. at 181–84.
Id. at 183.
98
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004).
99
Id.; see also Michael Wells et al., Why Constitutional Torts Deserve a Book of Their
Own, 22 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 857, 857 (1999) (“Over thirty years ago, Marshall Shapo
coined the term ‘constitutional tort’ to denote a suit brought against an official,
charging a constitutional violation and seeking damages.”).
97
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would serve as a useful guide.100 Although the Court favorably cited
Judge Edwards’s Tel-Oren concurrence,101 its understanding was
certainly more restrictive than his.102
Whatever the limitations and whatever the identity of the norms
that comprised the set of the law of nations as it existed in the federal
common law, the Supreme Court in Sosa cemented the role of
international law in deciding ATS cases. The Court thereby confirmed
the Second Circuit’s creation of a new “public tort” analogous to the
“constitutional torts” the Court had recognized in the previous two
decades.103
B. The Impact of ATS Litigation
ATS cases have changed the legal landscape in ways that are
important and worth preserving.104 They provide individual victims
with a way to pursue accountability (albeit in the form of civil liability)
for the specific person(s) who violated their rights. The impact of that
development is difficult to overstate. Despite the comparatively recent
rise of individual rights under international law,105 individual remedies
remain elusive even today. These remedies were almost entirely
unknown in 1980 when the Second Circuit decided Filártiga. Although
individuals today have more options available for seeking judicial106 (or
100

Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 (“This limit upon judicial recognition is generally
consistent with the reasoning of many of the courts and judges who faced the issue
before it reached this Court.”); Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980)
(“[F]or purposes of civil liability, the torturer has become—like the pirate and slave
trader before him—hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind.”).
101
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 886.
102
Judge Edwards included indefinite detention in his list of possible offenses that
would give rise to civil liability. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 781
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring).
103
See infra Part II.C.
104
See generally Koh, supra note 18.
105
The international community manifested its moral commitment to the
protection of individual rights with the unanimous passage of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights by the General Assembly in 1948, and its legal
commitment to the same principles with the entry into force of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1976 and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in 1976. See ICCPR, supra note 7; ICESCR, supra
note 7; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948).
106
Today, victims may bring human rights cases before the European Court of
Human Rights (ECHR), the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, and the African
Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights. Of the three, only the ECHR was active in the
early days of ATS litigation in the United States. And while international human rights
adjudication is an important advancement, these three tribunals cannot possibly
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at least institutional)107 declarations that state conduct violates human
rights law, mechanisms other than the ATS for seeking individual
accountability—outside the trials of a few dozen defendants in
international criminal trials over the last twenty years—are vanishingly
rare.108
ATS cases also provide international law with a much sought-after
enforcement mechanism. The dearth of such mechanisms (alleviated
somewhat but not eliminated in recent years)109 is in tension with
international human rights law’s emphasis on remedies for victims and
accountability for individual perpetrators of human rights abuses.110
Many international instruments, including treaties to which the United
States is a party, provide for both remedies and accountability, and
further place the burden for providing them squarely on states.111 The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), for instance, states
that “[e]veryone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent
national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted
him by the constitution or by law.”112 The International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights requires each state party to provide victims
with an effective, officially determined, and enforceable remedy.113
shoulder the burden of being the only available forums. Indeed, by their own terms,
these courts prefer enforcement in domestic courts. See How the Court Works, EUR. CT.
HUM. RTS., http://www.echr.coe.int/Pages/home.aspx?p=court/howitworks&c= (last
visited Dec. 20, 2015), for an explanation of how the ECHR processes cases and an
overview of its budget.
107
Most of the major human rights treaties are overseen by UN committees. In
some instances, those committees may hear individual complaints from citizens of
countries that have elected to allow such complaints. The committees in such
instances, however, only have the power to declare that the complaining party’s rights
were violated but not to order remedies. See Human Rights Treaty Bodies, UNITED
NATIONS, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/TBPetitions/Pages/
HRTBPetitions.aspx#individualcomm (last visited Dec. 29, 2015).
108
That is not to say that individual remedies or some measure of individual
accountability are nonexistent.
109
See supra notes 8–9 and accompanying text.
110
See infra Part III.B.
111
Gwynne L. Skinner, Roadblocks to Remedies: Recently Developed Barriers to Relief for
Aliens Injured by U.S. Officials, Contrary to the Founders’ Intent, 47 U. RICH. L. REV. 555, 569
(2013).
112
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 105; see also GWYNNE SKINNER
ET AL., THE THIRD PILLAR: ACCESS TO JUDICIAL REMEDIES FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
BY TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS (Dec. 2013), https://willamette.edu/wucl/pdf/faculty/
The%20Third%20Pillar%20hi%20res%20FINAL.pdf.
113
ICCPR, supra note 7, art. 2 states:
3. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes:
(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein
recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy,
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The Convention Against Torture is even more specific, requiring states
to ensure, through their domestic legal systems, that “the victim of an
act of torture obtains redress and has an enforceable right to fair and
adequate compensation”;114 that “competent authorities proceed to a
prompt and impartial investigation” of allegations of torture;115 and
that perpetrators of torture be prosecuted or extradited.116 Even
international tribunals that hear cases brought by individuals against
states evince a structural preference for domestic enforcement.117 ATS
cases provided a way to pursue that enforcement in a way that very few
other legal mechanisms in the world do.118
ATS cases give judges in the United States the opportunity to
participate in the global conversation that shapes transnational legal
norms—norms increasing in scope and character.119 Law, even in areas
notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by
persons acting in an official capacity;
(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have
his right thereto determined by competent judicial,
administrative or legislative authorities, or by any other
competent authority provided for by the legal system of the State,
and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy;
(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such
remedies when granted.
114
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (CAT) art. 14, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/46
(Dec. 10, 1984), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CAT.aspx.
115
Id. art. 12.
116
Id. arts. 6–7.
117
In human rights courts, where individuals may bring cases against states, that
preference is expressed through the doctrine of the exhaustion of domestic remedies.
See generally ANTONIO AUGUSTO CANCADO TRINDADE, THE APPLICATION OF THE RULE OF
EXHAUSTION OF LOCAL REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: ITS RATIONALE IN THE
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS (1983). In the context of individual
international criminal liability, the International Criminal Court (ICC) selfconsciously departed from the positioning of its predecessors as hierarchically
superior to domestic courts and adopted the principle of complementarity, which
permits the ICC to exercise jurisdiction only in the absence of good faith investigations
at the national level. See Bartram S. Brown, Primacy or Complementarity: Reconciling the
Jurisdiction of National Courts and International Criminal Tribunals, 23 YALE J. INT’L L. 383,
386 (1998) (“[C]omplementarity would replace the primacy of international tribunals
with priority for national courts.”).
118
See Beth Stephens, Translating Filártiga: A Comparative and International Law
Analysis of Domestic Remedies for International Human Rights Violations, 27 YALE J. INT’L L.
1, 32 (2002) (“No other legal system has a comparable statute.”). That is not to say
that ATS cases are unique in the world. See Robert McCorquodale, Waving Not
Drowning: Kiobel Outside the United States, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 846, 846–51 (2013).
119
See, e.g., Martin Shapiro, The Globalization of Law, 1 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD.
37 (1993); see also Paul Schiff Berman, From International Law to Law and Globalization,
43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 485 (2005); Kanishka Jayasuriya, Globalization, Law, and the

MILLER (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES AS TORT HARMS

2/1/2016 5:36 PM

527

usually thought of as purely domestic, is no longer formed and applied
exclusively within the closed borders of the sovereign state.120 Much
ink has been spilled over the question of whether, and to what extent,
the United States should internalize the norms of international law.121
Global legal norms, however, are not static entities such that the
United States can only incorporate them wholesale or leave them
alone. They change, emerge, and evolve in part through international
judicial conversation.122 Human rights litigation places judges in the
United States inside that conversation and thereby gives them a role in
the ongoing creation and development of international and
transnational legal norms.123
Civil litigation in general, and ATS cases in particular, provide a
cutting-edge mechanism for victims to pursue MNEs that may have
committed or been complicit in human rights abuses. While it is true
that only states have international legal obligations, with the exception
of individuals under international criminal law, MNEs increasingly
wield power equal to—if not surpassing—many states and have shown
themselves capable of conduct and harms that, if committed by a state,
would qualify as grave violations of human rights law.124 In the past
decade, the topic of “business and human rights” has garnered much
attention from officials, advocates, and academics. As a result of that
attention, major institutions such as the UN and the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) have promulgated
new norms urging MNEs to comply with international human rights
standards.125 While these high-profile initiatives have generated
Transformation of Sovereignty: The Emergence of Global Regulatory Governance, 6 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 425 (1999).
120
See generally Shapiro, supra note 119.
121
See infra Part IV.A.
122
Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 1103, 1123 (2000).
123
Melissa A. Waters, Mediating Norms and Identity: The Role of Transnational Judicial
Dialogue in Creating and Enforcing International Law, 93 GEO. L.J. 487, 558 (2005).
124
Major ecological catastrophes are a clear example of this phenomenon. But
corporations engage in a wide variety of behavior that would qualify as human rights
abuses if they were states, such as forced evictions and suppression of free speech and
association. See, e.g., Whose Development?: Human Rights Abuses in Sierra Leone’s Mining
Boom, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Feb. 19, 2014), http://www.hrw.org/reports/2014/02/
19/whose-development-0; “They Know Everything We Do”: Telecom and Internet
Surveillance in Ethiopia, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Mar. 25, 2014), http://www.hrw.org/
reports/2014/03/25/they-know-everything-we-do.
125
See generally ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES (2011), http://www.oecd.org/
corporate/mne/48004323.pdf; UNITED NATIONS HUM. RTS. OFFICE OF THE HIGH
COMM’R, GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: IMPLEMENTING THE
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ongoing momentum,126 the only complaint procedure created so far is
a soft-law process under the OECD, which allows individuals or
organizations to initiate a non-binding mediation process against
MNEs for failing to comply with the OECD’s guidelines.127 Civil
litigation offers a hard-law alternative to such soft-law mechanisms,
thereby improving the chance that plaintiffs will actually recover
damage awards (or settlements); that MNEs will actually modify their
behavior to conform more closely to human rights standards; and that
MNEs will contribute more effectively to democratic development in
the countries in which they operate.128
Finally, bringing human rights into U.S. courts on behalf of
foreign plaintiffs makes the power of the human rights vocabulary and
concepts more widely available to domestic public interest advocates.129
Although the United States has long been a supporter of human rights
abroad, the rhetoric of the international human rights movement has
historically struggled to find footing within the United States.130 Today,
UNITED NATIONS “PROTECT, RESPECT AND REMEDY” FRAMEWORK (2011),
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.
pdf.
126
A UN working group continues to engage both states and businesses in the
development and application of the Guiding Principles.
127
See The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, OECD WATCH,
http://oecdwatch.org/oecd-guidelines (last visited Dec. 21, 2015) for a description of
the complaint procedure. See Skinner, supra note 111, for an excellent and
comprehensive treatment of the ways in which advocates have sought judicial remedies
against corporations for human rights abuses and the obstacles they commonly face.
128
See Richard L. Herz, The Liberalizing Effects of Tort: How Corporate Complicity
Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute Advances Constructive Engagement, 21 HARV. HUM. RTS.
J. 207, 223 (2008) (“A corporation that abets human rights abuses will not impart
democratic values or provide a model for positive change.”). It is important to note
in the context of the discussion of MNEs that international human rights law and the
law applied in ATS cases—and, by extension, the argument presented in this Article—
are only concerned with the conduct of MNEs insofar as that conduct was undertaken
in conjunction with (e.g., conspiring, aiding, or abetting) states. Only states may
violate international law, and only state action triggers the public/private distinction
advanced herein. This Article does not take a position on the much more difficult
question of whether the power of MNEs and their consequent ability to visit the same
magnitude of harms as states can or should cause us to treat them differently than
other private actors.
129
See The Bringing Human Rights Home Lawyers’ Network, COLUM. L. SCH. HUM. RTS.
INST.,
http://web.law.columbia.edu/human-rights-institute/bhrh-lawyers-network
(last visited Feb. 13, 2015) [hereinafter Human Rights Institute]. The Bringing
Human Rights Home Lawyers’ Network has proven invaluable and provided several
“big wins.” Domestic advocates have learned to use transnational public relations
strategies to advance their goals. Chicago police torture cases are examples of other
notable successes of Bringing Human Rights Home.
130
See BRINGING HUMAN RIGHTS HOME x (Cynthia Soohoo et al. eds., 2007) (“[B]y
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however, domestic advocacy using the language of international
human rights is commonplace,131 as is using international forums to
catalyze domestic social change.132 ATS litigation played a key role in
that resurgence by educating U.S. lawyers and judges in international
law, who in turn disseminated the lessons to their peers engaged in
“purely” domestic advocacy.133 In that sense, ATS provided an entry
point into U.S. social justice discourse for the rhetoric and techniques
of international human rights advocacy.
All of the foregoing advantages of transnational public law
litigation (TPL) depend on the admixture of private and public
litigation and are therefore imperiled to the extent that the public law
aspects of human rights litigation (international law) are exchanged
for a purely private approach (torts).
C. Private Rights for Public Wrongs
The story of the emergence of human rights litigation in U.S.
courts is also the broader story of the emergence of the idea of private
rights of action for public wrongs. By explicitly rejecting “garden
variety municipal torts” as inadequate and instead embracing
international law as the rule of decision in ATS cases, advocates and
courts fashioned the third “public tort” in twenty years. The first
successful modern ATS case, filed in 1979, was preceded by the
Supreme Court’s 1961 decision creating “constitutional torts” in

the 1950s the separation between international human rights and domestic civil rights
appeared complete.”).
131
The Human Rights Institute at Columbia University, for example, maintains
The Bringing Human Rights Home Lawyers’ Network, a large and active group of
activists seeking to use international human rights norms in domestic social justice
advocacy. See Human Rights Institute, supra note 129.
132
Many domestic advocacy organizations, for instance, prepare reports to the
United Nations when it periodically reviews the performance by the United States of
its obligations under human rights treaties. In 2013, for instance, more than fortyseven civil society organizations in the United States submitted reports to the Human
Rights Committee detailing ways in which the United States violates its obligations
under the ICCPR. See ICCPR Newsletter No. 2: List of Issues Submissions, U.S. HUM. RTS.
NETWORK,
http://www.ushrnetwork.org/news-updates/iccpr-newsletter-no-2-listissues-submissions (last visited Oct. 21, 2015).
133
See BRINGING HUMAN RIGHTS HOME, supra note 130, at 217–19 (“ATS cases
concerning human rights abuses abroad have required federal judges to apply (and
thus learn about) international human rights law. The cases have played an important
role in educating U.S. lawyers and judges about international human rights law and
building case law on which they can rely.”).
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Monroe,134 which reimagined § 1983,135 and its 1971 decision in Bivens,136
which recognized a right of action for damages against federal officials
violating constitutional rights. Those cases and their progeny set the
precedent for the application of private law remedies to breaches of
public duty (constitutional rights) later built on by ATS cases for
breaches of a different public duty (international law). It is important
to note that the argument here is not that early ATS cases explicitly
drew on Monroe or Bivens to reach their decisions. Rather it is to make
the point, as have other commentators, that the three types of cases—
§ 1983, Bivens, and ATS—are similar enough to group together into
the category of “public torts.”137
It is important to note here that § 1983 allows for claims in equity
as well as for damages. The former conforms more closely to the
public law litigation model (discussed infra) while the latter—like
Bivens actions and ATS cases—mix private remedies and public harms.

134

Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961). See supra note 53 for further
explanations regarding the “overruling” of Monroe. See generally Sheldon Nahmod,
Section 1983 Discourse: The Move from Constitution to Tort, 77 GEO. L.J. 1719, 1721–25
(1989) (describing the origins of tort rhetoric in constitutional tort actions).
135
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
136
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971).
137
See, e.g., Koh, supra note 18, at 2347–48 (“Like its domestic counterpart
(christened fifteen years ago by Abram Chayes), transnational public law litigation
seeks to vindicate public rights and values through judicial remedies. In both settings,
parties bring ‘public actions,’ asking courts to declare and explicate public norms,
often with the goal of provoking institutional reform. Much as domestic public law
litigants have pursued Bivens and § 1983 litigation in federal courts seeking redress,
deterrence, and reform of state and federal institutions through judicial enunciation
of constitutional norms, transnational public law litigants have sought redress,
deterrence, and reform of national governmental policies through clarification of
rules of international conduct.”). See also Bivens, 403 U.S. at 388; William Casto, The
New Federal Common Law of Tort Remedies for Violations of International Law, 37 RUTGERS
L.J. 635, 645 (2006) (explaining that “[b]ecause ATS litigation in Sosa’s wake is so
obviously analogous to Bivens litigation, the same caution is pertinent to crafting tort
remedies for violations of international law”). Casto characterizes all three types of
claims as “mosaic actions,” meaning that the cause of action (norm) generally comes
from one body of law while the remedy comes from another. In other words, “mosaic
actions” are causes of action made up of a patchwork of different legal systems and
rules. Id. at 640 (“In each case [with litigation involving § 1983 or ATS] the norm to
be remedied comes from one body of law—the Constitution in one; international law
in the other—while the remedy comes from a different source—the Congress in §
1983 litigation; the federal courts in ATS litigation. When the norm and remedy are
joined, a cause of action is created.” Additionally, “[l]ike in ATS litigation, the norm
in Bivens that made the defendant’s conduct illegal came from one body of law, the
Constitution, and the federal judiciary supplied the remedy through judicial
legislation.”).
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The term “constitutional torts” is usually taken to encompass both
equity and damage actions under § 1983. But since the latter is more
important to the argument presented in this Article, the term will be
used to refer, collectively, to Bivens actions and claims for damages
under § 1983 but to exclude equity claims under § 1983.
Several features of classical private litigation were upended by the
rise in the mid-twentieth century of what commentators came to call
“public law litigation.”138 Private lawsuits under the classical model had
been understood to be primarily bipolar, in the sense that they
involved two opposed parties whose interests were similarly opposed.139
Court cases were zero-sum, winner-take-all affairs.140 A gain for one of
the bipolar parties was a loss for the other. Litigation was aimed at
retrospective relief.141 The available remedies were inextricably linked
to the nature of the harm.142 For instance, the compensation available
for a breach of contract would be linked to plaintiff’s loss, and the
damages in tort would be linked to the extent of the plaintiff’s injuries.
Lawsuits were self-contained in the sense that they were aimed only at
resolving the immediate dispute between the parties by payment,
performance, or enforcement of the status quo without further
involvement by the court.143 Finally, the parties to the dispute would
have both initiated and controlled the lawsuit, serving as the factfinders while the trial court judge served as a neutral arbiter.144
Public law litigation broke away from each element of the classical
model. Brown v. Board of Education serves as an excellent example of
that rupture. Brown explicitly sought to advance the interests of all
black schoolchildren.145 It did so through the class action mechanism,
but other cases at the time arrived at similarly broad representation
directly, by taking advantage of newly relaxed joinder rules, and
indirectly, by attempting to exert systemic influence through statutory
and constitutional interpretations.146 Furthermore, the aims of Brown
138

Harvard Law Professor Abram Chayes coined the term in an influential article
published in 1976. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1281 (1976).
139
Id. at 1282.
140
Id.
141
Id.
142
Id. at 1282–83.
143
Id. at 1283.
144
Chayes, supra note 138, at 1283.
145
See generally Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
146
Chayes, supra note 138, at 1284 (“School desegregation, employment
discrimination, and prisoners’ or inmates’ rights cases come readily to mind as avatars
of this new form of litigation. But it would be mistaken to suppose that it is confined

MILLER (DO NOT DELETE)

532

2/1/2016 5:36 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:361

were prospective, in addition to retrospective. Plaintiffs were not
simply seeking compensation for past injuries, but also judicial
protection from similar future injuries.147 They sought a fundamental
change in the way the government operated. That fundamental
change came by way of an injunction; the increased reliance on equity
in public law litigation severed the strong link in private law litigation
between the right and the remedy since an injunction necessarily deals
with contingencies and future probabilities. By definition, the
ongoing and systemic nature of the injunction in Brown meant that the
litigation was not self-contained in the sense that the issue was disposed
of by a single act (such as payment of damages) such that the judge’s
attention was freed for other things. Rather, it required significant and
ongoing judicial attention.
Constitutional torts, like ATS cases, combine elements of the
models of classical private litigation and modern public law litigation
into a hybrid, or “mosaic,” action.148 They link public norms with the
private remedy of damages.149 The litigation is bipolar (private) in the
sense that it involves two individual parties, yet they are not the same
type of party. One is a public agent while the other is not, and their
interests are therefore not as symmetrically opposed as those of two
private parties. While the litigation is retrospective, about an
“identified set of completed events”150 (private), it is also prospective,
seeking “norm enunciation”151 and institutional change (public).
Unlike public law litigation, however, where equitable remedies break
the traditional link between right and remedy, public tort litigation
restores that link by seeking damages derived from the harm suffered.
In that sense, public tort cases are self-contained; the judge’s
involvement ends with ordering or denying damages. She will not
become embroiled in managing a long-running and complex social
program, such as school desegregation, or an environmental cleanup.
Nor will she be called on, in either the merits or the remedial phase,
to play a significant role in fact-finding.

to these areas. Antitrust, securities fraud and other aspects of the conduct of corporate
business, bankruptcy and reorganizations, union governance, consumer fraud,
housing discrimination, electoral reapportionment, environmental management—
cases in all these fields display in varying degrees the features of public law litigation.”).
147
Id.
148
Casto, supra note 137, at 639–41.
149
Id. at 640.
150
Chayes, supra note 138, at 1282.
151
Koh, supra note 18, at 2349.
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The most important aspect of public torts in the present context
is the decision of the courts to supplant private law with public law as
the rule of decision, while retaining the bipolar structure and remedies
of private litigation.152 Briefly examining the Supreme Court’s
reasoning in justifying the creation of constitutional torts in Monroe
and Bivens will help to illuminate what is at stake in deciding whether
to translate human rights abuses into tort claims. In Monroe, thirteen
Chicago police officers entered the Monroe home—without a warrant
or probable cause—and forced the six members of the family to stand
naked in the living room while they ransacked the house in search of
evidence related to a recent murder.153 The police then detained Mr.
Monroe, the father, for an additional ten hours of interrogation,
denied him access to an attorney, and then finally released him without
charges. In Justice Douglas’s majority opinion, the Supreme Court
held that plaintiffs retained a federal cause of action for violations of
their constitutional rights by state officials acting under color of state
law even if that state’s common law of torts already provided a
remedy.154
By explicitly making the federal remedy available, even if a
remedy in tort was available in state courts, Justice Douglas implicitly
established a preference for the constitutional approach over the
common law one. Much of the reasoning in the opinion rested on the
legislative history of § 1983 and the historical background against
which it had been enacted.155 In the aftermath of the Civil War, lawless
state officials allowed the Ku Klux Klan to engage in open campaigns
of violence. But Justice Douglas did not base the Court’s opinion in
1961 on the existence of the kind of lawlessness at the state level that
existed in 1871. Quite the opposite, the Court held that “[t]he federal
152

In a sense, Filártiga can be read as a contest over the enforcement of the brightline classical separation of private from public claims. As the defense noted at the
initial trial:
[P]laintiffs appear to confuse the whole of international law, which may
very well concern itself with private claims, with the law of nations, which
governs “questions of right between nations.” In clear and obvious
terms, § 1350 grants federal jurisdiction only over torts committed “in
violation of the law of nations.” It does not purport, either expressly or
otherwise, to bestow jurisdiction over claims based on private
international law. Insofar as plaintiffs’ claim sounds in the latter, it
cannot be heard in a federal forum.
ACEVES, supra note 67, at 526 (citations omitted).
153
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). See supra note 53 for explanations
regarding the “overruling” of Monroe.
154
Id. at 183.
155
Id. at 17280.
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remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need not
be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked.”156 While
the majority opinion is silent on why that federal remedy might be
preferred, even to practically available (as opposed to theoretically
available) state remedies, the concurring opinion of Justice Harlan
anchors the preference, in part, on the insufficiency of at least some
state remedies for at least some deprivations of constitutional rights.157
Justice Douglas did not, however, completely remove torts from the
picture, noting in an influential dictum that § 1983 “should be read
against the background of tort liability that makes a man responsible
for the natural consequences of his actions.”158
The precise
relationship of tort concepts to § 1983 actions continues to confound
courts and scholars, but it is clear that some relationship exists and that
both are, in one way or another, at play.159
In contrast to ATS and § 1983 claims, which were provided for by
statute, the Court in Bivens derived an implied right of action from the
importance of the rights guaranteed by the Constitution and the need
to provide a remedy for the unique harm that occurs when an agent of
the government violates those rights.160 The case arose when federal
agents stormed the plaintiff’s house without a warrant and arrested
him after humiliating him in front of his wife and children.161 His
home was searched before he was taken into custody where he was
interrogated, booked, and subjected to a visual strip search.162 In the
156

Id. at 183.
Id. at 196 n.5. (“There will be many cases in which the relief provided by the
state to the victim of a use of state power which the state either did not or could not
constitutionally authorize will be far less than what Congress may have thought would
be fair reimbursement for deprivation of a constitutional right . . . . It would indeed
be the purest coincidence if the state remedies for violations of common law rights by
private citizens were fully appropriate to redress those injuries which only a state
official can cause and against which the Constitution provides protection.”) (Harlan,
J., concurring).
158
Id. at 187 (majority opinion).
159
See, e.g., Sheldon H. Nahmod, Section 1983 and the “Background” of Tort Liability,
50 IND. L.J. 5 (1974); Michael L. Wells, Civil Recourse, Damages-As-Redress, and
Constitutional Law, 46 GA. L. REV. 1003 (2012); Christina B. Whitman, Constitutional
Torts, 79 MICH. L. REV. 5 (1980).
160
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 390 (1971). Justice Douglas noted the following, citing Justice Harlan’s
concurring opinion in Monroe: “The injuries inflicted by officials acting under color of
law, while no less compensable in damages than those inflicted by private parties, are
substantially different in kind, as the Court’s opinion today discusses in detail.” Id. at
409 (citing Monroe, 365 U.S. at 195 (Harlan, J., concurring)).
161
Id. at 389–90.
162
Id. at 390. Bivens asserted that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated
157
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Supreme Court, the government argued that privacy interests
protected by the common law were at stake in the case, as opposed to
constitutional rights, and that the case would therefore be properly
resolved in state court under the common law of torts.163
The Court disagreed, emphasizing the difference between the
relationship of a citizen to the state and the relationships among
private individuals:
Respondents seek to treat the relationship between a citizen
and a federal agent unconstitutionally exercising his
authority as no different from the relationship between two
private citizens. In so doing, they ignore the fact that power,
once granted, does not disappear like a magic gift when it is
wrongfully
used.
An
agent
acting—albeit
unconstitutionally—in the name of the United States
possesses a far greater capacity for harm than an individual
trespasser exercising no authority other than his own.164
Indeed, the Court went on to note that the relationships are so
fundamentally different that “[t]he interests protected by state laws
regulating trespass and the invasion of privacy, and those protected by
the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee against unreasonable searches
and seizures, may be inconsistent or even hostile.”165 Thus, the Court
in Bivens declared explicitly what it had only hinted at in Monroe: that
certain harms caused by public officials can only properly be treated as
violations of the public law even if the same harm, caused by a private
person, would be susceptible to claims under private law.166
Hence the Court conceived of constitutional torts as not only
offering plaintiffs a way to be compensated for the harms they suffered,
but also as engaging in the project of redrawing or reinforcing the
appropriate lines between the exercise of state power and the
protection of individual rights.167 The latter became the defining
project of the civil rights era.
because the arrest occurred with an unreasonable amount of force and made without
probable cause. Id.
He also claimed that he suffered great humiliation,
embarrassment and mental suffering as a result of the unlawful conduct. Id.
163
Id.
164
Id. at 391–92.
165
Id. at 394.
166
Bivens, 403 U.S. at 394. As Justice Douglas noted, citing Justice Harlan’s
concurring opinion in Monroe, “The injuries inflicted by officials acting under color of
law, while no less compensable in damages than those inflicted by private parties, are
substantially different in kind, as the Court’s opinion today discusses in detail.” Id. at
409 (citing Monroe, 365 U.S. at 195 (Harlan, J., concurring)).
167
Bivens, 403 U.S. at 39192.
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Of course, the choice to create public torts (the constitutional
torts of Monroe and Bivens and the public international torts of the
ATS) can be understood as a matter of preference, depending on
which bundles of goods might be produced by which tactics and trial
strategies. Will torts versus human rights result in a higher chance of
a favorable verdict and award? How does that balance against the
potential loss of the moral victory afforded by a judicial
pronouncement that the defendant violated human rights standards?
In that sense, perhaps the courts in public torts cases were only
expressing a contingent, all-things-considered preference for public
law over private law when they repeatedly chose the former over the
latter. Yet that reading seems to ignore the strength of the courts’
language, the way their creation of public torts stemmed from a sense
of obligation, and their sense of themselves as engaged in drawing the
boundaries of acceptable exercises of state power against individuals.
If, as suggested by the courts’ language, there is a strong
normative justification for preferring public law to private law as the
rule of decision in public torts, then the notion of translating human
rights claims into the language of torts becomes less of a tactical
balancing act and more an approach that, having been considered,
should be abandoned or at the least seriously questioned.168 Part III of
this Article will advance such a strong normative justification, showing
that the notion of equality that permeates the law of torts is wholly
inadequate for redressing public harms. Since that argument
questions the project of translating human rights claims into torts, Part
IV will offer a novel alternative to translation.
III. CLASH OF NORMATIVITIES
What was behind the courts’ preference for the language of
international law, or constitutional rights, over that of torts? What did
Justice Brennan mean in Bivens when he said that “[a]n agent acting—
albeit unconstitutionally—in the name of the United States possesses
a far greater capacity for harm than an individual trespasser exercising
168

Having said that, injured plaintiffs, particularly those who are the victims of
human rights abuses, should not be held hostage to the normative prescriptions of
legal scholars. To the extent that a claimant seeks only compensation for her injuries,
nothing should prevent her from securing that compensation through whatever legal
avenues might be available to her. This Article rather proceeds on the assumption
that at least some plaintiffs and advocates intend to pursue human rights claims in
state courts in order to achieve at least some of the broader, systemic results such
litigation has been aimed at in the past. It is to the latter group that the argument
herein is directed.
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no authority other than his own[?]” If the injuries in either case would
be the same, what is the source of the greater harm in the case of a
violation of rights by an agent of the state?
A. The Inevitably Public and Political Commitment to Torture
1. A Problem with the Rule of Law
The first hint of an answer can be found by examining the mistake
commentators make in the commonly repeated assertion that
“[a]lmost every international law violation is also an intentional tort.
Torture is assault and battery. Terrorism is wrongful death. Slavery is
false imprisonment.”169 While torture may encompass, among other
things, acts of assault and/or battery, the reverse is not true. Assault
does not encompass torture. At the most basic level, this difference
can be appreciated by comparing the legal definitions of the two
wrongs. The common law tort of battery is usually defined as the
intentional causation of harmful or offensive contact with another
person without that person’s consent.170 A common definition of
torture is:
[A]ny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical
or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such
purposes as obtaining from him or a third person
information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or
a third person has committed or is suspected of having
committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third
person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any
kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public
official or other person acting in an official capacity.171
On a purely textual level, then, it becomes clear that battery fits neatly
into the definition of torture but not vice-versa; the definition of
battery lacks, among other features of torture, the requirement that
the act(s) be undertaken by a public official pursuant to a program of
punishment, interrogation, intimidation, or discrimination. There are
other salient differences. While the statute of limitations for battery
varies from state to state, two years is common.172 Under U.S. law, the

169

Alford, supra note 4, at 1750.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 (1965).
171
CAT, supra note 114, art. 1.
172
See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 335.1, 349.4 (West 2015); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01243 (2015).
170
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statute of limitations for a torture claim is ten years,173 while under
international law there is no statute of limitations.174
There must be strong public reasons to justify the different
standards of liability imposed under international law and under most
domestic systems for public officials who violate international human
rights law and private citizens who commit torts. Without these
reasons, human rights laws—at least those with tort analogues—may
be void on rule of law grounds. Analyzing the rule-of-law issues raised
by the translation project will show that any legal system which
proscribes human rights abuses qua human rights abuses necessarily
commits itself to at least a weak version of the typically Continental
view that individuals exercising a public function are, legally at least,
categorically different that private actors pursuing private ends.
Among other things, the rule of law requires that laws be general in
the sense that they apply equally to everyone.175 The precise contours
of the principle of generality are contested, but most commentators
would agree that a law imposing different standards of liability on
different classes of citizens for the same acts without adequate
justification fails to satisfy the requirement.176 In comparing human
rights abuses and tort harms, the question then becomes why it might
be the case that a public official tortures while a private citizen batters.
The answer to that question will provide the first step in the normative
argument against translating human rights abuses into tort harms.
It is clearly the character of the individual undertaking the
conduct designated “torture,” rather than the nature of the conduct
itself, that must provide the justifiable distinction if one is to be
173

See TVPA, supra note 31.
CAT is silent in the issue of any limitation on the time within which victims must
claim redress, but the Committee against Torture has addressed the issue. See Comm.
Against Torture, Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment 9, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/GC/3 (Nov. 19, 2012),
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cat/docs/GC/CAT-C-GC-3_en.pdf
(“On
account of the continuous nature of the effects of torture, statutes of limitations should
not be applicable as these deprive victims of the redress, compensation, and
rehabilitation due to them.”).
175
See Paul Gowder, Equal Law in an Unequal World, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1021, 1036–45
(2014).
176
H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593,
624 (1958); see, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 237 (Oxford Univ. Press rev. ed.
1999) (also giving “like cases alike” conceptions of generality). See also F.S. Royster
Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920) (“[T]he classification must be
reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair
and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly
circumstanced shall be treated alike.”).
174
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provided at all. If it were simply a matter of wishing to classify battery
undertaken in order to interrogate, intimidate, punish, coerce, or
discriminate (call these forms “battery-plus”) differently than other
forms of battery (“ordinary” forms of battery, such as getting into a bar
fight), there would be no need to restrict the class of persons to which
the law applies. Indeed if acts of battery-plus were in and of themselves
more offensive than acts of ordinary battery, lawmakers would have
every incentive to make enhanced penalties and longer statutes of
limitation for battery-plus general. But they are not.
It must, then, be something in the nature of a public official acting
in a public capacity that justifies differentiating between torture and
battery. This might at first seem puzzling since the Anglo-American
common law tradition has long treated public officials just like
ordinary citizens for the purposes of assessing tort liability.177 Civil law
traditions, by contrast, treat public officials—as representatives of the
nearly metaphysical entity that is the state—as coordinately superior to
private individuals.178 Since human rights law by its own terms applies
only to state actors, maintaining strict adherence to the common law
tradition of non-differentiation leads to the rule of law problem
described above. Any cause of action that singles out public officials,
such as in Bivens and § 1983 claims, is susceptible to the same problem.
A resolution to the apparent tension can be found in the theory that
individuals exercising a public function stand in a different legal
relationship to others than do individuals acting in their private
capacity.179
Those differing relationships are precisely what makes translating
human rights abuses into tort harms inapposite. Specifically, the
notions of equality that animate tort law and those that animate the
public law, as well as the scope of the duties generated by each, set
them too far apart for the latter to be useful in addressing the former.
177

See generally A. V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE
CONSTITUTION, (8th ed., Macmillan & Co. 1915) (1885). See also M. Allars, Tort and
Equity Claims Against the State, in 2 ESSAYS ON LAW AND GOVERNMENT: THE CITIZEN AND
THE STATE IN THE COURTS 49, 49–100 (Paul Desmond Finn ed., 1996); Peter Cane,
Damages in Public Law, 9 OTAGO L. REV. 489 (1997–2000).
178
See JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ROGELIO PÉREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW
TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 94
(3d ed. 2007) (“In private legal relations [including tort law] the parties were equals
and the state the referee. In public legal relations the state was a party, and as
representative of the public interest (and successor to the prince) it was a party
superior to the private individual.”).
179
See generally Peter Cane, Tort Law and Public Functions, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW OF TORTS 148 (John Oberdiek ed., 2014).
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2. Unequal Equalities
The operation of the concepts of vertical and horizontal equality,
defined below, work in diametrically opposite ways when applied to
private harms than when applied to public harms. The narrow
conception of equality on which the private system of tort law rests is
incompatible with the broader notion of equality at stake when
addressing public wrongs. Claims under § 1983, Bivens, and the ATS
dealt with the incompatibility, albeit incompletely, by specifically
requiring the application of the public law itself to the merits of the
case, thereby offering at least the possibility that judicial decisions will
serve to enunciate norms and to identify a policy or practice that was
unlawful.180 Tort law, on the other hand, lacks the tools to address that
incompatibility, and framing human rights violations as “garden
variety municipal torts” brings the conceptual tension into stark relief.
There are of course many tort theories, which diverge wildly in
their understanding of the desired ends of a system of tort law and of
the optimal institutional arrangements required to achieve those
ends.181 But one need not adopt any particular perspective to
understand the problems that arise when treating public wrongs as
torts because a similar notion of equality underlies most—or at least
most non-instrumentalist—tort theories.182 A word here about
nomenclature: contemporary tort theories fall roughly into two
categories. The first derives (often, though not exclusively) from the
Aristotelean tradition183 and is concerned with “such notions as
corrective justice, rights, duty, fairness, reciprocity, noninstrumentalism, and deontology.”184
These tend to focus on
individuals as the proper locus of analysis. In the present context, the
term “rights-based” will suffice to describe this category.185 Theories in
the second category are concerned more with the systemic attributes
of the tort law as they relate to the achievement of such moral ends as
180

See supra Parts II.A–B.
See PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 179, for an
excellent overview of the current state of thinking.
182
See Stephen Darwall & Julian Darwall, Civil Recourse as Mutual Accountability, 39
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 17, 17 (2011), for the claim that morality underlying tort law is
equality-based. See also Ofer Grosskopf, Horizontal Equality and the Law of Torts, in
HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE PRIVATE LAW 357, 357 (Daniel Friedmann ed., 2001) (“In its core,
tort law clearly reflects a notion of equality; no man is allowed to cause damage to his
fellow since no one is superior to another.”).
183
See ERNEST WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 99 (1995).
184
Stephen Perry, Torts, Rights and Risk, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE
LAW OF TORTS, supra note 179, at 38.
185
Id.
181
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welfare maximization or efficiency.186 This Article will refer to such
theories as “instrumentalist” (although other names are common, such
as “economic, functionalist, pragmatist, welfarist, utilitarian, and
consequentialist”187).
In both versions, tort law rests on some notion of equality. But
“equality” is a hotly contested word that admits of many definitions.
The most basic understanding of equality is to treat like things alike.
But that of course begs, at a minimum, the questions of what
constitutes sufficient similarity to qualify, and what constitutes similar
treatment for those who do qualify. In instrumentalist versions,
equality is a fairly stripped-down idea of two individuals who have the
same freedom to pursue their own (private) purposes and projects,
and therefore the same ability to bargain for the costs and benefits of
that activity.188 Tort law then assigns to judges the role of fixing and
ensuring the distribution of those costs and benefits.
Equality in rights-based theories looks at the bundles of rights. A
detailed examination of the nature of equality and its relationship to
tort law is far beyond the scope of this Article. One particular aspect,
however, is important in the present context: most rights-based tort
theories emphasize issues of vertical equality and reject any hint of
horizontal equality. Ensuring vertical equality means treating the
plaintiff and the accused tortfeasor as existing in a closed universe.
Under this notion, the parties are abstracted from their respective
positions in society, as well as their positions relative to one another.
Vertical differentiators, like wealth, class, or other markers of status
and hierarchy, are stripped away and the parties are made
(conceptually) equal. What matters in this closed universe is that both
parties are accorded by the political and legal institutions of the society
in which they find themselves (or sue, or are sued) with the same
bundle of rights and obligations.189 Some, but not all, of those rights
186

Id.
Id.
188
Nancy A. Weston, The Metaphysics of Modern Tort Theory, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 919,
928 (1994) (“[The Coasian] position is remarkable for its formalism: In its abstraction
of the parties from the context of accidents they lose their character as tortfeasor or
victim—roles that, on this model, are interchangeable and so without their ordinary
content. That content, as reflected in traditional conceptions of tort law, has to do
with the perceived direction of causation of the accident, with the parties’ relative
activity and passivity in bringing it about, or with other differentia in the parties’
concrete relation to the occurrence of the accident. Disregarding this relation, the
Coasian model posits a formal equivalence, just as in the theory of the market, which
the tort model consciously emulates.”).
189
See Jan Klabbers, Doing the Right Thing? Foreign Tort Law and Human Rights, in
187
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give rise to correlative duties in the other party. The legal question
then boils down to whether those rights and duties were breached in a
way that caused compensable injury.190 So if a billionaire were run over
by a harried, minimum-wage service employee on her way to work, the
law would not take into account the infinitesimally small wealth of the
service employee in comparison to the billionaire in determining how
much was owed in damages.
A formulation that captures both the instrumentalist and rightsbased versions of equality has it that tort law assumes a “juridical
equality” between the parties.191 Here, the modifier “juridical” makes
it clear the salient features for identifying “like” cases are legal features
(as distinguished from, say, social or economic features).
Instrumentalist and non-instrumentalist theories may describe that
juridical equality in different terms, of course. The former may focus
on the parties’ equal (legal) freedom to bargain and to pursue their
own ends, while the latter may focus on the individuals’ reciprocal
bundles of rights and duties.
Broader normative theory gives a much deeper meaning to
“equality,” of course, and many theorists take the tort system to task for
failing to address horizontal inequality—that is, for excluding any
notion of distributive justice that addresses all similarly situated
individuals in a society whether or not they happen to be involved in a
court case.192 Critiques from the distributive justice angle argue that
TORTURE AS TORT 553, 558 (Craig Scott ed., 2001) (“[H]uman rights typically deal with
individuals as part of larger communities. By contrast, private law, and tort law in
particular, brackets any social relation that individuals may have, instead focusing on
the purely bilateral relation between victim and tortfeasor.”).
190
See Grosskopf, supra note 182, at 359 (“This . . . process is designed to allow the
courts to take into account only one basic variable, namely whether a wrong was
committed between the parties, and by default to reject all other possible variables,
such as the parties’ identity, needs or wealth, as irrelevant, and hence illegitimate.”).
191
Cane, supra note 179, at 148 (“Mainstream theoretical accounts of the nature of
tort law and tort liability, whether instrumentalist or non-instrumentalist, generally
assume that both parties to a tort action are ‘juridically equal’ private agents pursuing
their own projects and purposes.”).
192
See WEINRIB, supra note 183, at 206–14 (differentiating tort law, which the author
claims expresses corrective justice, from “politics,” which he claims expresses
horizontal equality and distributive justice); see also JULES COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF
PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENCE OF A PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY 9 (2001)
(explaining that “tort law is best explained by corrective justice”); ERNEST WEINRIB,
CORRECTIVE JUSTICE 2 (2012) (“Corrective justice is the term given to the relational
structure of reasoning in private law”); Stephen Perry, On the Relationship Between
Corrective and Distributive Justice, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 238–62 (Jeremy
Horder ed., 2000); Martin Stone, The Significance of Doing and Suffering, in PHILOSOPHY
AND THE LAW OF TORTS 131 (Gerald Postema ed., 2001).
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the fiction that makes the narrow, juridical conception of equality
work—that the parties exist in a closed universe separated from their
actual social condition—may serve the individuals involved in the case
but fails society as a whole. It does so by failing to situate the potentially
tortious behavior in the broader social system in which that behavior
operates and in which its toleration (including by assigning a dollar
value to its exercise) has systemic effects.193 So understood, torts should
incorporate horizontal equality by giving significant weight to the role
and effects of tortious behavior all across society, not just to the injurer
and the injured.194 Those advancing the dominant, rights-based
theories of torts defend the rejection of horizontal equality by arguing
that torts at the bedrock normative level, is about correcting the
specific results of specific wrongful behavior. Therefore, “[t]he claims
of corrective justice are limited or restricted to parties who bear some
normatively important relationship to one another. A person does
not . . . have a claim in corrective justice to repair in the air, against no
one in particular.”195
These understandings of horizontal and vertical equality and how
they apply to the classical law of torts governing private interactions
between private individuals (individuals exercising their freedom to
pursue their own projects and purposes) help to illuminate the ways in
which the narrow model of juridical equality falls apart in the case of
public wrongs. First, the notion of vertical equality cannot apply where
one of the parties is a public agent exercising a public function.196 The
victim of a public wrong and the alleged wrongdoer do not have the
same bundle of rights and obligations because they are, in a sense,
completely different kinds of actors. The former is a citizen, but the
latter is the representative of the state and an extension of the powers
granted to it by citizens collectively—such as the monopoly over the
use of force. That is not to say that the looming threat of force is the
factor that disrupts the equal bilateral relationship of private actors. It
is only to illustrate one of the many ways in which a public official is
both authorized and constrained by an entirely different set of rights
and duties than an ordinary citizen.197 Private individuals, for instance,
193

Gregory C. Keating, Distributive and Corrective Justice in the Tort Law of Accidents,
74 S. CAL. L. REV. 193, 195 (2000).
194
Id.
195
Jules L. Coleman, The Practice of Corrective Justice, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS
OF TORT LAW 53, 66–67 (David G. Owen ed., 1995).
196
ROBERT STEVENS, TORTS AND RIGHTS 219–20, 225–28 (2007).
197
Cane, supra note 179, at 154 (“[S]tatutory and constitutional provisions may
impose on public agents duties . . . that private agents do not have and that are
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are free to pursue their own projects and are under no obligation that
those projects advance the public good, or that they refrain from using
their resources for personal, instead of common, gain. Yet those are
precisely the constraints we put on the state and on agents of the state
exercising their public function.198 As clarified below, this is neither a
stark division nor a binary choice between private individual or public
agent. Rather, it is a continuum.199
The second problem that arises when considering applying
classical torts to public wrongs is that the notion of horizontal equality
takes on a distinctly different character and becomes intrinsic to the
harm, rather than becoming an optional “bonus,” the justification for
which may be debated depending on one’s theoretical tendencies.
Remedies that address only the disequilibrium between the two parties
to a lawsuit cannot reach the harm done to a body politic by a wrongful
policy or practice. The reason that judicial review or legislative reform
are the traditional legal remedies for public wrongs is because a policy,
practice, or law that violates the legal protections afforded to
individuals is itself offensive to the legal regime that guarantees those
rights, and judicial review “fixes” the entire regime. It is not simply a
matter of the abstracted binary relationship between two people, but
instead an injury that implicates the nature of the proper relationship
of a citizen to governmental power and authority. Whereas injury to
an individual can be remedied by compensating her for the value
assigned to those injuries, the harm to the social contract cannot be
remedied except by changing the offensive policy or practice.
Consider the contrasting cases of a pedestrian hit by a speeding
car and a murder suspect tortured to produce a confession. Consider
further that the torturing officer’s superiors are either complicit in, or
willfully ignorant of, her conduct but that there is no written or formal
rule or policy condoning torture. In the former instance, the driver’s
duty would only be to those pedestrians she might be in danger of
injuring at any given time, but certainly not to all pedestrians anywhere

correlative to rights . . . . [P]ublic agents may enjoy statutory protection from tort
liability that private agents do not.”).
198
Cane, supra note 179, at 151 (“In this sense, states pursue public projects and
purposes, and a public interest, which are distinguishable from and may conflict with
the personal projects, purposes and interests of particular private agents. To be
justified within this framework of thought, the state’s claimed monopoly of legitimate
coercion must be used (only) in the public interest and to promote public purposes,
but consistently with preserving for private agents the largest possible measure of
freedom to pursue their own projects and purposes.”).
199
See infra note 200 and accompanying text.
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and at any time. Furthermore, the driver can only be said to have
violated that duty with respect to the person she sideswiped. We would
not say that the other pedestrians, those who arrived home safely, were
somehow injured by the accident; by breaking the arm of the victim,
the driver did not break the arms of all pedestrians everywhere. The
victim’s injuries were her own. The essentially self-contained nature of
such injuries is what makes it possible to conceptually cordon off such
private torts from one another and to abstract tort victims from other
members of society who suffer similar harms from non-tortious sources
or causes.
The police officer and her colluding superiors, by contrast, do
have a duty to everyone (at least everyone in the territory over which
they have authority). When the officer tortures one person, it is true
that only that one person suffers the physical injuries. In that sense
the harms are not shared. The injury, however, is to the relationship
between the government and the governed, specifically defined in the
Constitution and international law to exclude torture. The victim’s
right to a relationship that excludes torture is diminished, but so is that
of every other individual in the officer’s territory because in the
moment that torture became approved or tolerated, everyone in the
city went from living under a regime that prohibited it to one that
allowed it. Classifying the victim’s torture as assault and battery and
the police officer as an individual tortfeasor would result in the victim
being compensated but would ignore systemic characteristics of the
case. Such a characterization would fail to address the role of the
officer’s superiors and to provide a remedy to the rest of the
population for the harm done to their rights. Public harms are not
susceptible to being described as self-contained and are thus much
more difficult to fit into the abstracted binary universe required by tort
law. The horizontal aspect of equality becomes non-optional in the
case of public wrongs because horizontal elements are intrinsic to the
duty, the harm, and the proper remedy.
The inclusion of horizontal elements of equality in public torts
need not be absolute. The above discussion considers situations where
the public wrongs are undertaken according to a policy or practice.
One could argue that situations where an official was acting outside of
established policies and practices—a rogue agent—would be closer to
the classical model of torts since the harm would be more closely
restricted to the individual victim. Take the example of a homicide
detective who systematically tortures confessions from African-
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American suspects.200 Assume that his superiors are completely
unaware of his conduct (and that their ignorance is reasonable rather
than willful). The argument would be that the broader public in this
case is not injured. Since the detective’s superiors did not approve of
or willfully ignore his conduct, the broader public’s right to live under
a government that refrains from torture has not been affected. In that
sense, it would be more appropriate to pay compensation to the
rogue’s victim alone, rather than to push for unnecessary institutional
changes.
Although it is conceptually possible for such acts to be undertaken
in isolation by rogue agents, that may not always be the case. In the
Chicago police torture case, for instance, the police department and
the city of Chicago went to great lengths to cover up Detective Burge’s
crimes. The more that the organization around the “rogue” is
involved, the more the bad actor’s activities become a practice rather
than an aberration and the more horizontal political equality is
implicated. At any rate, the point here is not to offer a detailed defense
of particular sharp divisions along the continuum of public wrongs to
which public remedies are intrinsic and those for which some kind of
private remedy would be adequate. The point, rather, is to note that
the continuum exists. Also, the more the duties, injuries, and desirable
remedies in a case implicate horizontal political inequality, the more
inappropriate it is to shoehorn those cases into an abstracted binary
universe absent of horizontal considerations.
The public tort schemes under § 1983, Bivens, and the ATS
circumvent those problems in the ways described supra in Part II.C, but
classical tort law has trouble adequately accounting for such
distinctions. This will be shown in the next section by highlighting the
extent to which international law’s remedies for breaches of human
rights obligations combine both horizontal and vertical elements of
equality.

200

This is an actual case. Chicago homicide detective John Burge tortured
confessions from more than 100 African-American suspects using techniques such as
electroshock. See Special Projects Conclusion Rep. from Investigator Michael
Goldston for the Office of Prof’l Standards, to Chief Admin. of Office of Prof’l
Standards 6 (Sept. 28, 1990), http://peopleslawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/
2012/02/Goldston-Report-with-11.2.90-Coversheet.pdf (“In the matter of alleged
physical abuse, the preponderance of the evidence is that abuse did occur and that it
was systematic . . . . The type of abuse described was not limited to the usual beating,
but went into such esoteric areas as psychological techniques and planned torture.”).
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B. Horizontal Equality and Remedies for Public Harms
Comparing the duties and remedies at stake in a human rights
case decided under international law and a torts case decided under
the common law reinforces the conclusion of the theoretical inquiry:
the private law of tort law cannot adequately address violations of public
law.
The proposal that victims of human rights violations could pursue
claims under the law of torts in state courts is premised on the idea
that “[t]he same facts that give rise to international human rights
violations almost always will also constitute a domestic or foreign
tort.”201 Several commentators have noted that nearly every jurisdiction
has a body of law that provides for civil liability for certain injuries.202
This is seen as an advantage because state courts in tort cases would
apply choice of law principles to determine whether to apply the law
of the place of injury or the law of the forum. Unless the United States
had a compelling interest in the case, the usual result of the choice of
law analysis would be the law of the place of injury.203 The universality
of tort-like legal norms is therefore an important part of the argument
that victims may still find compensation.204 Although many plaintiffs in
ATS cases have pleaded state law tort violations, in the end they were
adjudicated under federal/international law rather than under the
ATS.205 Several other ATS cases actually proceeded in state courts.206
First, briefly, the duties that give rise to public harms are different
than the duties that give rise to private harms. This stems from the
201

Alford, supra note 4, at 1761.
STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 57, at 120 (“The same conduct that constitutes a
violation of international human rights norms usually also violates the law of the place
where it occurred and the law of the forum state . . . .”); see also Hoffman & Stephens,
supra note 45, at 1819.
203
Chimene Keitner, State Courts and Transitory Torts in Transnational Human Rights
Cases, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 81, 81 (2013).
204
See Alford, supra note 4. Although other systems may recognize tort harms, they
frequently restrict the amount of damages available. Borchers, supra note 46, at 5255.
205
See Hoffman & Stephens, supra note 45, at 15 (“The state law claims often drop
out when plaintiffs obtain a judgment on the international human rights claim.”).
206
See, e.g., Alomang v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 718 So. 2d 971 (La. Ct. App. 1998).
In Alomang, the Louisiana Court of Appeals itself translated the plaintiff’s claims, which
were originally stated in terms of international law. When the defendant objected on
the grounds of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the appeals court noted that
“[a]lthough the emphasized language quoted above from the opinion of the trial
court creates the impression that the claims of the plaintiff are limited to ‘human
rights violations and foreign environmental damages,’ plaintiff’s actual allegations are
far broader. Plaintiff also alleged that members of the purported class have sustained
personal injury damages . . . .” Id. at 972.
202
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unbridgeable vertical inequality between public officials exercising
public functions and private individuals. That is what the Supreme
Court was insinuating in Monroe and Bivens when it established a
preference, at least in some circumstances, for the application of
constitutional law over the common law. Preserving that difference is
one of the issues at stake in deciding whether to translate human rights
abuses into tort harms. Because a human rights abuse is committed by
(or, in the case of corporations, in complicity with) a public official
exercising a public function, torture, by definition, cannot be
committed by a private individual—only a state official. As one
commentator observed:
Thus, if torture paradigmatically involves official acts, such as
those committed by government agents or, at least, under
colour of law, then it becomes awkward to completely ignore
this official aspect and instead focus on the individual
relation between torturer and victim. To do so would be
tantamount to denying the official element of torture, and
thereby to render it indistinguishable from assault or battery
or other forms of inflicting pain.207
In other words, a police officer has a duty not to torture the citizens
under her care that is different in kind and in origin from the duty of
private individuals to refrain from intentional battery. Casting the
former as the latter obscures which kind of duty the wrongdoer
violated.
That distinction is important because human rights abuses, as
opposed to torts, require remedies tailored to their nature as public
harms. Since international human rights law is directed not only at
addressing the harms to individuals but also to protecting all
individuals from similar harms, the remedies for human rights abuses
encompass both the kinds of aims characteristic of public law—such as
reforming the institutional structures that made the torture possible in
the first place—and of private law—such as providing the victim with
monetary compensation.208 International human rights law specifies
207

Klabbers, supra note 189, at 558.
See Comm. Against Torture, Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 9, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/GC/3 (Dec.
13, 2012), http://coremanipur.org/2013/10/08/general-comment-no-3-of-the-uncommittee-against-torture/ (follow “General Comment No 3 on Article 14 CAT”
hyperlink) (discussing the implementation of article 14 by States parties); see also Basic
Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of
Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law, G.A. Res. 60/147, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/147 (Dec.
16, 2005), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/
208
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five aspects for the effective redress of grave human rights abuses:
restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction, and guarantees
of non-repetition.209 Some of those aspects touch both the individual
and the body politic. Restitution, for instance, requires states to place
the victims—to the extent possible given each specific case—in the
position they were in prior to the abuse.210 But restitution is not only
about the victim as an isolated individual: “For restitution to be
effective, efforts should be made to address any structural causes of the
violation . . . .”211 Compensation and rehabilitation, on the other hand,
are specifically related to the individual. Nevertheless, “monetary
compensation alone may not be sufficient redress for a victim of
torture and ill-treatment.”212
The elements of satisfaction and the guarantee of non-repetition
are almost entirely state-centric and highlight the understanding in
international law that human rights violations require the state to
initiate institutional reform to protect those in its territory from
further violations. Satisfaction, among other things, requires that
states publicly acknowledge the violation:
This is not simply the right of any individual victim or closely
related persons to know what happened, a right to the truth.
The right to know is also a collective right, drawing upon
history to prevent violations from recurring in the future. Its
corollary is a “duty to remember[,]”[] which the State must
assume, in order to guard against the perversions of history
that go under the names of revisionism or negationism; the
knowledge of the oppression it has lived through is part of a
people’s national heritage and as such must be preserved.
These, then, are the main objectives of the right to know as
a collective right.213

RemedyAndReparation.aspx [hereinafter Basic Principles and Guidelines].
209
See Comm. Against Torture, supra note 208, at 2.
210
See Declaration of Basic Principles of Just. for Victims of Crime and Abuse of
Power ¶ 8, G.A. Res. 40/34 A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/40/34 (Nov. 29, 1985),
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/40/a40r034.htm
(explaining
that
“[o]ffenders or third parties . . . should . . . make fair restitution to victims, their
families or dependents. Such restitution should include the return of property or
payment for the harm or loss suffered, reimbursement of expenses incurred as a result
of the victimization, the provision of services and the restoration of rights.”).
211
Comm. Against Torture, supra note 208, at 2.
212
Id.
213
LOUIS JOINET, COMM. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE AND
THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF DETAINEES, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/20/Rev.1, at para. 17 (Oct.
1997), http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/impu/joinet2.html.
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That requirement is particularly important in light of the potential
translation of international human rights abuses into tort harms.
Although the obligation to acknowledge the violation rests on the
wrongdoing state, the underlying rationale for the obligation—the
rights of the individual victims to truth and of the broader society to
knowledge in service of future prevention—would be satisfied at least
to some extent by a neutral court finding a violation of international
human rights law. Returning to the facts of Filártiga, the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals declared publicly and eloquently that Peña,
and by direct implication, Paraguay, engaged in torture. But it seems
difficult to argue that the desire for truth and remembrance would
have been as well satisfied, if satisfied at all, by a state court in New York
awarding the Filártigas damages for wrongful death.
Satisfaction and the guarantee of non-repetition require not only
truth, but also accountability of the individuals who commit the abuses
and of the system in which they operate.214 Individual accountability in
this context includes the obligation to investigate alleged abuses and
to pursue “judicial and administrative sanctions against persons liable
for the violations.”215 Institutional accountability requires states to
identify and change the aspects of its system that contributed to the
violations. Since many human rights are closely tied to core
government functions such as the maintenance of law and order or the
management of the political process, the required changes could be
far ranging, such as providing for:
[C]ivilian oversight of military and security forces; ensuring
that all judicial proceedings abide by international standards
of due process, fairness and impartiality; strengthening the
independence of the judiciary; protecting human rights
defenders . . . establishing systems for regular and
independent monitoring of all places of detention;
providing . . . [and] training for law enforcement officials as
well as military and security forces on human rights law.216

214

Satisfaction and the guarantee of non-repetition may require, in addition to
accountability, depending on the situation, additional actions such as “effective
measures aimed at the cessation of continuing violations; verification of the facts and
full and public disclosure of the truth . . . assistance in the recovery, identification, and
reburial of victims’ bodies . . . an official declaration or judicial decision restoring the
dignity, the reputation and the rights of the victim . . . public apologies . . . [and]
commemorations and tributes to the victims.” Comm. Against Torture, supra note 208,
at 4.
215
See Basic Principles and Guidelines, supra note 208.
216
Comm. Against Torture, supra note 208, at 4.
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In summary, international law requires, among other things, the
following: a finding that the individual accused of violating human
rights standards was performing a public function (or, in another
formulation, acting under the color of law); a determination that the
acts she is alleged to have undertaken violated the specific human
rights standard complained of (e.g., torture); and, in the event the two
conditions are satisfied, a finding of redress that addresses the harm to
the victim while simultaneously ensuring both individual
accountability for the perpetrator and institutional accountability for
the system in which she operates. While TPL fails to perfectly satisfy
all of those requirements, it goes significantly further towards doing so
than municipal tort law.
IV. A BETTER APPROACH
The successful transition of human rights litigation in the United
States away from federal courts and into state courts depends on both
the availability of international law to state courts and the extent of
those courts’ discretion to decline to hear international law claims.
Fortunately, state courts can, and indeed must, hear claims arising
under the federal common law of customary international law, which
at least includes the kinds of claims recognized by the Supreme Court
in Sosa. To date, commentators have largely ignored the possibility
that state courts might be forced to hear human rights cases under
human rights law, perhaps because the actual prospect of state court
litigation of international human rights cases was not of practical and
immediate concern until the Supreme Court shut the doors of federal
courtrooms in Kiobel. Part IV will analyze the feasibility of such a
transition, discussing both requirements—availability and discretion—
in turn. The first subsection will sketch out the “modern” position
endorsed by the Court that international law is part of U.S. law and will
advance a reading of Kiobel under which the Court left the modern
position undisturbed. Building on the conclusion that federal
common law continues to provide claims under customary
international law after Kiobel, the next subsection will argue that the
Supremacy Clause requires state courts to hear those claims (with
narrow exceptions).
A. States and International Law
Although much scholarly contention exists regarding the status of
international law in the American legal system, courts have adopted
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what has come to be called the “modern” position.217 This position
asserts that the “[i]nternational law and international agreements of
the United States are law of the United States and supreme over the
law of the several states.”218 The modern position thus unambiguously
holds that international law is federal law and preempts contrary state
law.219 A brief excursion into the underpinnings of the modern
position will help to illuminate the kind of influence federal decisions
will likely exert over the range of claims state courts might recognize
under international law and their flexibility in interpreting
international law norms.
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins,220 international law was part of the general law of the United
States and was therefore available to any court at any level.221 Its
incorporation into U.S. law was unambiguous, captured in the oftquoted opinion of the Court in The Paquete Habana: “[i]nternational
law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the
courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often as questions of
217

In some instances, scholars from different camps construe the same decision in
very different ways to support very different arguments. In that sense, the degree of
unanimity of the courts is a matter of interpretation. It is worth noting, however, that
even those launching the most direct attack on the modern position acknowledge its
pervasiveness. See Carlos Manuel Vasquez, Customary International Law as U.S. Law: A
Critique of the Revisionist and Intermediate Positions and a Defense of the Modern Position, 86
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1495, 1609–18 (2011).
218
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 111(1) (1987). See also Ryan
Goodman & Derek P. Jinks, Filártiga’s Firm Footing: International Human Rights and
Federal Common Law, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 463 (1997); Harold Hongju Koh, Is
International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824 (1998); Gerald L. Neuman,
Sense and Nonsense About Customary International Law: A Response to Professors Bradley and
Goldsmith, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 371 (1997); Beth Stephens, The Law of Our Land:
Customary International Law as Federal Law After Erie, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 393 (1997).
219
Vasquez, supra note 217, at 1497–98 (“Reflecting the settled view regarding the
status of customary international law in the U.S. legal system at the time that it was
approved in 1987, the Restatement asserts that such law has the status of federal law. As
such, it preempts inconsistent State law; State courts must follow federal court
interpretations of it; and State court interpretations of it are reviewable in the federal
courts.”).
220
304 U.S. 64 (1938).
221
See Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842); William A. Fletcher, The General Common Law
and Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789: The Example of Marine Insurance, 97 HARV. L.
REV. 1513 (1984); see also Koh, supra note 218, at 1831 (“Thereafter, federal courts
construed both commercial and noncommercial rules of customary international law
so regularly that Justice Gray provoked no dissent when he wrote: ‘International law is
part of our law . . . .’”); Ernest A. Young, Sorting Out the Debate over Customary International
Law, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 365, 371 (2002) (explaining that “federal courts for nearly 100
years applied ‘general’ law . . . sometimes called the ‘law merchant[‘]—[that] was ‘a
subset of the law of nations’”).
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right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination.”222
Under the “Swiftian” general law approach, both federal and state
courts were free to apply and interpret international law but neither
could review the decisions of the other.223 The general law model was
intended to result in the harmonization of judicial opinion on
important topics of law, but lacked a mechanism for reliably
generating that harmonization.224 Thus, amidst increasing concerns
about federalism and uniformity, the Supreme Court in Erie
announced the end of the general law and severely limited the content
of the federal common law.
The uniformity concerns of the Erie Court apply directly to
international law given the potential for individual states’ actions in
contravention of international law to harm the nation as a whole and
to undermine the ability of the executive branch to conduct foreign
relations.225 The first argument to that effect came shortly after the
Court’s decision in Erie. Philip Jessup, who would later become a judge
on the International Court of Justice in The Hague, published an essay
in which he argued that the decision did not change, but rather
reinforced, the status of international law as part of the federal
common law. Jessup argued that “[a]ny question of applying
international law in our courts involves the foreign relations of the
United States and can thus be brought within a federal power.”226
Justice Harlan, writing for an 8-1 majority in Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino, later quoted Jessup’s reasoning approvingly.227 The
Court cited several reasons for agreeing with Jessup. One is that, in
222

The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
Young, supra note 221.
224
See Erie, 304 U.S. at 74 (“Experience in applying the doctrine of Swift v.
Tyson had revealed it defects, political and social; and the benefits expected to flow
from the rule did not accrue. Persistence of state courts in their own opinions on
questions of common law prevented uniformity; and the impossibility of discovering a
satisfactory line of demarcation between the province of general law and that of local
law developed a new well of uncertainties.”).
225
That strong interest in strong uniformity is sometimes called the “one voice”
position. Daniel Abebe, One Voice or Many? The Political Question Doctrine and Acoustic
Dissonance in Foreign Affairs, 2012 SUP. CT. REV. 233, 233 (2012) (“A common theme in
foreign affairs law is the importance of the US speaking with ‘one voice’ to the
international community. Speaking with one voice, so the story goes, ensures that the
US is not embarrassed by multiple, inconsistent pronouncements from the several
states or the different branches of the national government when it takes a position
on a foreign affairs issue.”).
226
Philip C. Jessup, The Doctrine of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins Applied to International
Law, 33 AM. J. INT’L L. 740, 743 (1939).
227
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
223
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concept, foreign relations fell firmly in the realm of federal powers.228
Another reason is that leaving international law to the states posed the
danger of fragmentation, and therefore, the “rules of international law
should not be left to divergent and perhaps parochial state
interpretations.”229 The Court here appeared to make a structural
argument: if states could violate international law, they could invite
repercussions on the United States as a whole. International law
provides that states (the word “state” in this context refers to sovereign
nations) as a whole are held to be responsible for violations of
international law, even violations by some sub-unit (such as a
regulatory agency, or one of the several states).230 In other words, a
state (say, Canada) affected by the breach of an American state (say,
Michigan dumping toxic waste across the international border) could
enact countermeasures, such as economic sanctions, against the entire
United States.231 The American Founders recognized the problem
inherent in unfettered state conduct in the realm of international law;
in fact, the lack of federal control over international law during the
time of the Articles of Confederation was a major driver of the new
Constitution’s adoption, and ensuring that the national government
would be able to conduct foreign policy was at the forefront of the
Founders’ minds.232 Thus, leaving states to their unfettered discretion
in interpreting and applying international law would both create a free
rider problem (where the country subsidizes states’ international law
violations) and encroach on the foreign affairs power of the federal
government.
228

Id. at 425 (explaining that “an issue concerned with a basic choice regarding
competence and function of the Judiciary and the National Executive in ordering our
relationships with other members of the international community must be treated
exclusively as an aspect of federal law”). See also Koh, supra note 218.
229
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 425. While Judge Harlan’s “endorsement of Jessup’s view
that customary international law is federal law is admittedly dictum, . . . it was wellconsidered dictum.” Vasquez, supra note 217, at 1536; see also Koh, supra note 218.
230
See U.N. Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries (2001), http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/
instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf.
231
See Vasquez, supra note 217, at 1517–19.
232
See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 19 (Max Farrand ed.,
1937) (“[Edmund Randolph] then proceeded to enumerate the defects . . . that
particular [S]tates might by their conduct provoke war without controul [sic] . . . .”);
see also id. at 24–25 (“[Randolph] observed that . . . [i]f a state acts against a foreign
power contrary to the laws of nations or violates a treaty, [the Confederation] cannot
punish that State, or compel its obedience to the treaty . . . . It therefore cannot prevent
a war.”); JAMES MADISON, VICES OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM OF THE UNITED STATES (1787),
reprinted in SELECTED WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 35, 35–36 (Ralph Ketcham ed.,
2006); Vasquez, supra note 217, at 1519 n.110.
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Sosa, to some extent, supports the modern view by holding that
“[w]hatever the ultimate criteria for accepting a cause of action subject
to jurisdiction under § 1350, we are persuaded that federal courts
should not recognize private claims under federal common law for
violations of any international law norm with less definite content and
acceptance among civilized nations than the historical paradigms
familiar when § 1350 was enacted.”233 By implication, the claims under
international law that the Court does recognize are, indeed, part of the
federal common law.234 As Judge Fletcher of the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals observed, “we [now] know . . . that there is a federal
common law of international human rights based on customary
international law.”235 Judge Fletcher further noted that “we also [now]
know . . . that the federal common law of customary international law
is federal law in both the jurisdiction-conferring and the supremacyclause sense.”236 But did that federal common law of customary
international law survive Kiobel? If so, in what form?
The federal common law of customary international law must
have survived Kiobel intact. Much has been made of the ambiguity of
Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion, but ultimately the resolution of the
question regarding Kiobel’s treatment of international law turns on
what the Court did not say. The difficulty arises from the Court’s choice
to deploy the presumption against extraterritoriality—a canon of
statutory construction—in a situation where there was no appropriate
statute to construct. The Court in Sosa held, and the Court in Kiobel
affirmed, that the ATS was merely a jurisdictional grant while the
federal common law of international law provided the cause of

233

Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 733 (2004). The majority is silent on
which claims, exactly, might qualify. Justice Breyer, however, in a separate opinion,
suggested that “[t]oday international law will sometimes similarly reflect not only
substantive agreement as to certain universally condemned behavior but also
procedural agreement that universal jurisdiction exists to prosecute a subset of that
behavior. That subset includes torture, genocide, crimes against humanity, and war
crimes.” Id. at 762 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
234
Ralph G. Steinhardt, Laying One Bankrupt Critique to Rest: Sosa v. AlvarezMachain and the Future of International Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts, 57 VAND.
L. REV. 2241, 2254 (2004). This understanding of Sosa is not, however, universally
shared. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, Jack L. Goldsmith & David H. Moore, Sosa,
Customary International Law, and the Continuing Relevance of Erie, 120 HARV. L. REV. 869,
919–24 (2007); Ernest A. Young, Federal Suits and General Laws: A Comment on Judge
Fletcher’s Reading of Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 93 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 33 (2007).
235
William A. Fletcher, International Human Rights in American Courts, 93 VA. L. REV.
653, 664 (2007).
236
Id.
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action.237 But the presumption of extraterritoriality does not apply to
purely jurisdictional statutes.238 Nor could a canon of statutory
construction apply to the common law. What, then, did the Court
mean when it noted that “we think the principles underlying the canon
of interpretation similarly constrain courts considering causes of
action that may be brought under the ATS”239 or that “the principles
underlying the presumption against extraterritoriality constrain the
courts exercising their power under the ATS[?]”240
Some
commentators argue that the opinion was at best ambiguous and at
worst manipulative,241 while others read it as clearly reaching the
federal common law of international law in addition to the ATS.242
Both analyses miss that the Court conspicuously fails to address
any of the touchstones of the analysis of the status of international law
in U.S. law. The Court in Sosa examined all the precedents a student
of the modern position would expect to conclude that customary
international law is indeed part of U.S. law: The Paquete Habana,243
Sabbatino,244 Erie,245 and esteemed commentators such as Emmerich de
Vattel246 and Justice Jessup.247 Furthermore, the Court provides a cause
of action for violations of a certain subset of the law of nations. Justice
Roberts’s failure to deal with even one of those sources in Kiobel, would
seem to indicate that the Court was chary of fiddling with its
conclusions about the status of international law in the United States—
particularly when it could dispense with federal litigation under the
ATS by construing the statute alone. Absent evidence that the Court
237

Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664 (2013) (“The ATS,
on the other hand, is ‘strictly jurisdictional.’”) (quoting Sosa, 542 U.S. at 713).
238
See Louise Weinberg, What We Don’t Talk About When We Talk About
Extraterritoriality: Kiobel and the Conflict of Laws, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 1471, 1474
(“Roberts clearly understood that a canon of statutory construction cannot be imposed
in a blanket way on a grant of jurisdiction.”). See also Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664 (“We
typically apply the presumptions to discern whether an Act of Congress regulating
conduct applies abroad.”) (emphasis added); William S. Dodge, Guest Post: Dodge—The
Presumption Against Extraterritoriality Does Not Apply to Jurisdictional Statutes, OPINIO JURIS
(Jan. 28, 2014, 12:00 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2014/01/28/guest-post-dodgepresumption-extraterritoriality-apply-jurisdictional-statutes/.
239
Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664.
240
Id. at 1665.
241
Weinberg, supra note 238.
242
Young, supra note 44.
243
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 730 (2004).
244
Id. at 726.
245
Id.
246
Id. at 714.
247
Id.

MILLER (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES AS TORT HARMS

2/1/2016 5:36 PM

557

in Kiobel reinterpreted any of the relevant precedents that informed its
characterization of the federal common law of customary international
law in Sosa, the conclusion must be that the characterization remains
intact.
Having established that at least some norms of customary
international law are part of the federal common law, the Court failed
to specify whether it was restricting the causes of action under the ATS
because: (a) only those international norms enjoying “definite content
and acceptance among civilized nations”248 are part of the federal
common law (“Option A”); or (b) some larger body of international
norms are part of the federal common law, but out of judicial restraint
the Court would only recognize causes of action for the subset of those
norms enjoying “definite content and acceptance among civilized
nations”249 (“Option B”). It is crucial to distinguish here between claims
available under the federal common law of international law and the
norms of the federal common law of international law. The two
categories might be, but need not be, coextensive. Federal law is full
of norms that provide no basis for recourse to the courts.250 Hence the
category of international law norms may be significantly larger than
the category of federal claims available under those norms.
This is important because state courts, as courts of general
jurisdiction, do not require a specific jurisdictional grant like federal
courts do—constrained by Article III of the Constitution.251 The
Court’s finding in Kiobel that the jurisdiction conferred by the ATS on
federal courts did not extend outside the territory of the United States
would not therefore bind state courts when considering the extent of
their own jurisdiction.252 Nor would state courts obviously be bound by
the Court’s determination in Sosa of the claims available under the
federal common law since that decision construed the limits of federal,
not state, jurisdiction.253 Under Option B (where the category of norms
248

Id. at 694.
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 694.
250
Indeed, as the Court acknowledges in Sosa, “[a]ccordingly, even when Congress
has made it clear by statute that a rule applies to purely domestic conduct, we are
reluctant to infer intent to provide a private cause of action where the statute does not
supply one expressly.” Id. at 727.
251
U.S. CONST. art. III.
252
Recall the Court’s holding in Sosa that the ATS was a mere jurisdictional grant.
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 694 (explaining that “the ATS is a jurisdictional statute creating no
new causes of action”).
253
See Vasquez, supra note 217, at 1626 (“The Court in Sosa did not directly address
whether the States were permitted to recognize a right of action for damages to
enforce norms of international law not meeting the heightened standard of clarity and
249
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is larger than the category of claims) state courts would therefore be
free to consider human rights claims for violations of customary
international norms that fall short of the Court’s lofty standard in Sosa.
Under Option A (where the categories of norms and claims are
coextensive), such additional claims would not be available to states
because they would not be part of the federal common law.254
There are several reasons to be hesitant about embracing Option
B. First, the Court’s restraint in implying new causes of action suggests
that it was concerned about intruding on the foreign affairs
prerogative of the executive and legislative branches:
[T]he potential implications for the foreign relations of the
United States of recognizing such causes should make courts
particularly wary of impinging on the discretion of the
Legislative and Executive Branches in managing foreign
affairs. It is one thing for American courts to enforce
constitutional limits on our own State and Federal
Governments’ power, but quite another to consider suits
under rules that would go so far as to claim a limit on the
power of foreign governments over their own citizens, and to
hold that a foreign government or its agent has transgressed
those limits.255
If the Court was concerned that federal judicial action on certain types
of weaker international law claims could encroach on the discretion of
the political branches, it would be counterintuitive to suppose that the
Court would acquiesce in state courts entertaining such weaker claims.
Another reason to be wary is that state courts extending too far past
the doctrinal limits established by federal courts could tempt the
Supreme Court to bring the “dormant implied international relations
clause”256 out of retirement to invalidate state acts that touch, even
lightly, on foreign policy.257
At the least, then, those international law claims that would pass
Sosa’s stringent standards are available to state courts (Option A). But
the ability to apply international law is not the same as the willingness
breadth of acceptance that it articulated.”).
254
Of course this presupposes that courts will continue to endorse the modern
view. The revisionist position and most of the views advanced as intermediate positions
would argue (albeit for different reasons) that international law remains available to
the states without regard for the actions of the federal government. See id.
255
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 727.
256
Fletcher, supra note 235, at 667.
257
Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 436 (1968) (invalidating a state probate
statute due to “state involvement in foreign affairs and international relations—
matters which the Constitution entrusts solely to the Federal Government”).
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to do so. The next section will show that if human rights cases make it
into state courts (past a host of constitutional and procedural
obstacles), those courts will be compelled to apply the federal common
law of international law.
B. Mandatory State Court Jurisdiction over International Law
If the foregoing analysis is correct and federal common law
continues to provide causes of action under the law of nations after
Kiobel, then state courts will have no choice but to hear such claims
unless the federal causes of action are excluded by a neutral rule of
judicial administration.258 Commentators have recognized for some
time that state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over international
law claims.259 Indeed, the original text of the statute expressly provided
for the concurrent jurisdiction of state courts.260 Assuming that
international law remains part of the federal common law after Kiobel,
there is every reason to believe that state courts retain that concurrent
jurisdiction and that they must exercise it when called upon to do so.
State courts have at best limited discretion to refuse to entertain
federal claims, which has been established precedent since the end of
the Civil War when, in Claflin v. Houseman, the Court read the
Supremacy Clause to require state courts to apply federal law.261 It is
258

Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 735 (2009) (“So strong is the presumption of
concurrency that it is defeated only in two narrowly defined circumstances: first, when
Congress expressly ousts state courts of jurisdiction, and second ‘[w]hen a state court
refuses jurisdiction because of a neutral state rule regarding the administration of the
courts.’”) (citations omitted).
259
William R. Casto, The Federal Courts’ Protective Jurisdiction over Torts Committed in
Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 CONN. L. REV. 467, 509 (1986) (“The logical
conclusion in view of the general presumption of concurrent jurisdiction and the
codification of section 1350 is that the states have concurrent jurisdiction over all cases
arguably within the statute.”); Joan Hartman, Enforcement of International Human Rights
Law in State and Federal Courts, 7 WHITTIER L. REV. 741, 748 (1985) (“In state courts the
claim would simply be treated as a cause of action arising under federal common law,
and any court of general jurisdiction could probably take cognizance of it. There is
no barrier to state courts entertaining cases arising under international law, and the
ordinary concurrent jurisdiction of state and federal courts is appropriate for
international cases.”).
260
In its original form, the Judiciary Act of 1789 read, in pertinent part, that district
courts “shall also have cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several States, or
the circuit courts, as the case may be, of all causes where an alien sues for a tort only
in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” The Judiciary Act of
1789, Ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77. Nor should the later deletion of the phrase be read as
Congressional intent to establish exclusive federal jurisdiction. See Casto, supra note
259, at 508 n.232.
261
Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 137 (1876) (noting that state and federal law
“together form one system of jurisprudence, which constitutes the law of the land for
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worth emphasizing in this context that international law, generally
speaking, is federal law in the Supremacy Clause sense.262 Despite a
series of vehement attacks by scholars skeptical of according
international law the status of federal law,263 no court has yet adopted
a view contrary to the Restatement’s formulation.264 Claflin established
the presumption of concurrent jurisdiction for federal statutory law,
and subsequent cases held that the presumption includes federal
common law as well.265
From the inception of the modern
presumption of concurrent jurisdiction, the Court recognized that in
some instances state courts might validly decline to hear federal claims,
asserting by implication that state courts might escape the
presumption where they lacked the competence to hear the kind of

the State; and the courts of the two jurisdictions are not foreign to each other, nor to
be treated by each other as such, but as courts of the same country, having jurisdiction
partly different and partly concurrent”). Testa v. Katt approvingly quoted language
from a prior case:
The suggestion that the act of Congress is not in harmony with the policy
of the State, and therefore that the courts of the state are free to decline
jurisdiction, is quite inadmissible, because it presupposes what in legal
contemplation does not exist. When Congress, in the exertion of the
power confided to it by the Constitution, adopted that act, it spoke for
all the people and all the states, and thereby established a policy for all.
That policy is as much the policy of Connecticut as if the act had
emanated from its own legislature, and should be respected accordingly
in the courts of the state.
Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 392 (1947) (quoting Mondou v. N.Y., New Haven, &
Hartford R.R. Co., 223 U. S. 1, 57 (1912)).
262
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 111 cmt. d (1987)
(“International agreements of the United States other than treaties (see § 303), and
customary international law, while not mentioned explicitly in the Supremacy Clause,
are also federal law and as such are supreme over State law. Interpretations of
international agreements by the United States Supreme Court are binding on the
States. Customary international law is considered to be like common law in the United
States, but it is federal law. A determination of international law by the Supreme Court
is binding on the States and on State courts.”).
263
Opponents of the modern position fall into one of two camps: revisionist or
intermediate. For the revolutionist position, see, for example, Curtis A. Bradley & Jack
L. Goldsmith, The Current Illegitimacy of International Human Rights Litigation, 66
FORDHAM L. REV. 319 (1997); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary
International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L.
REV. 815 (1997); and Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts and the
Incorporation of International Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2260 (1998). For the intermediate
position, which has several variations, see A. M. Weisburd, State Courts, Federal Courts,
and International Cases, 20 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (1995) and Young, supra note 221, at 370.
264
It is worth noting, however, that the American Law Institute has begun work on
the Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law. Many of the main players from
all sides of the academic debate are participants in the project.
265
See Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
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claim being brought.266 Beginning almost immediately, the Court
began to more clearly identify, and to narrow, the grounds on which a
state court might validly decline jurisdiction over federal claims.267 In
Testa v. Katt the Court indicated that state courts were not free to refuse
to hear federal claims where “[state] courts have jurisdiction adequate
and appropriate under local law to adjudicate this action.”268 It is at
this juncture that the importance of categorizing ATS cases alongside
Bivens and § 1983 cases reasserts itself.
The Court took the opportunity, in a series of cases arising from
the reluctance of state courts to entertain § 1983 cases against state
officials, to limit significantly the ability of state courts to refuse to hear
federal claims. In the Court’s view, only two circumstances warranted
such refusal: where Congress expressly created exclusive federal
jurisdiction, or where there exists an application of a “neutral state rule
regarding the administration of the courts.”269 In several of those cases,
the Court found state courts presumptively competent to hear federal
cases where the state judicial power, understood broadly, empowered
state courts to hear the types of cases and issue the type of relief at stake
in the federal claim.270 The implication of the Court’s jurisprudence
on the presumption of concurrent jurisdiction is that states need not
establish courts of general jurisdiction, but if they do so then those
courts must entertain federal claims which require hearing the type of
claim (such as injury caused by a public official) and issuing the type
of remedy (such as equitable relief or monetary damages) that those

266

Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 136 (1876) (“Legal or equitable rights,
acquired under either system of laws, may be enforced in any court of either
sovereignty competent to hear and determine such kind of rights and not restrained
by its constitution in the exercise of such jurisdiction.”).
267
Mondou v. N.Y., New Haven, & Hartford R.R. Co., 223 U. S. 1, 57 (1912) (“The
suggestion that the act of Congress is not in harmony with the policy of the state, and
therefore that the courts of the state are free to decline jurisdiction, is quite
inadmissible, because it presupposes what in legal contemplation does not exist.
When Congress, in the exertion of the power confided to it by the Constitution,
adopted that act, it spoke for all the people and all the states, and thereby established
a policy for all. That policy is as much the policy of Connecticut as if the act had
emanated from its own legislature, and should be respected accordingly in the courts
of the state.”).
268
Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 394 (1947).
269
Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 392 (1990).
270
See Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 146 n.3 (1988) (where the Court looked to
“common law tort analogues” to evaluate the competence of state courts); see also
Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 283 n.7 (1980) (“[W]here the same type of claim,
if arising under state law, would be enforced in the state courts, the state courts are
generally not free to refuse enforcement of the federal claim.”).
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state courts are competent to adjudicate.271
In practice, then, the validity of any given state court’s refusal to
hear claims arising under the federal common law of customary
international law would depend on whether such refusal rested on a
neutral rule of judicial administration. The Court has approved
several of these, including: statutes requiring at least one party is a
resident of the state;272 venue laws that restricted jurisdiction where the
cause of action arose outside the territory of the state;273 and forum non
conveniens.274 And so we return to the observation made at the outset
of this Article. Plaintiffs will face many barriers to bringing human
rights claims in state courts. Some are constitutional, such as the limits
on general personal jurisdiction over foreign corporate subsidiaries.275
Others are procedural, such as forum non conveniens.276 Barriers will vary
from state to state. But this Article is not about the barriers to accessing
state courts; it is about what happens in the likely event that ambitious
advocates and motivated plaintiffs overcome those barriers. As the
foregoing analysis makes clear, plaintiffs who make it past the doors of
state courts will find themselves facing judges required by the
Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution to hear claims arising
under those norms of customary international law that have become
part of the federal common law.
V. CONCLUSION
All the groundbreaking advantages of litigation under the ATS
that have occupied scholars and advocates since the Second Circuit’s
landmark decision in Filártiga stand to be lost if the next generation of
human rights claims in the United States is brought in state courts as
tort claims. Like all public torts, the public international torts
271

See Howlett, 496 U.S. at 380 (“The requirement that a state court of competent
jurisdiction treat federal law as the law of the land does not necessarily include within
it a requirement that the State create a court competent to hear the case in which the
federal claim is presented. The general rule, bottomed deeply in the belief in the
importance of state control of state judicial procedure, is that federal law takes the
state courts as it finds them.”); see also Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 740 (2009)
(“We therefore hold that, having made the decision to create courts of general
jurisdiction that regularly sit to entertain analogous suits, New York is not at liberty to
shut the courthouse door to federal claims that it considers at odds with local policy.”).
272
See, e.g., Douglas v. N.Y., New Haven, & Hartford R.R. Co., 279 U.S. 377 (1929).
273
See, e.g., Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945).
274
See, e.g., Missouri ex rel. Southern R. Co. v. Mayfield, 340 U.S. 1 (1950).
275
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 285657
(2011).
276
Whytock et al., supra note 45, at 6.
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recognized under federal common law blend public-law and privatelaw remedies into a hybrid that more closely adheres to the
international legal standards for redress of international human rights
violations rather than either standard public-law remedies or strictly
private-law ones. The former—judicial review and legislative reform—
ignore the injury to specific victims in favor of systemic change. The
latter rejects systemic considerations and focuses exclusively on the
parties, abstracted from their respective positions (official or not) in
society. Redress for public harms should encompass both kinds of
remedies, an avenue offered only by public torts.
Advocates seeking to translate international human rights abuses
into tort harms in order to gain access to state courts are not only
sacrificing normativity on the altar of practicality, but are doing so
unnecessarily. State courts may be compelled to hear cases arising under
customary international law as part of the federal common law. But
even if they are not, many state courts have shown their willingness to
recognize public torts when the underlying rights are compelling and
the claimants have no alternative remedies. The next generation of
human rights cases in the United States should therefore be filed as
international human rights cases. No translation necessary.

